Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-96-055 *20 March 1996*

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Bulgaria: Herzog Promises Support for EU Process

LD2003115196 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network in German 1100 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] German President Roman Herzog has promised Bulgaria German support on its way into the European Union. Germany sees Bulgaria as an integral part of Europe, Herzog said in an address to the parliament in Sofia today. He added that a few obstacles would still need to be overcome before full membership in the EU is granted, and in this process Bonn could only help Bulgaria help itself. Herzog called on the parliament to continue to strengthen the democratic process in the country. It was important to make progress in introducing the market economy and to promote personal initiative.

At the start of his three-day visit, Herzog and Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev signed a cultural agreement this morning.

Bulgaria: Russian Help in Saving Arms Industry Viewed

AU1903205096 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 19 Mar 96 p 2

[Commentary by Lyudmila Zasheva: "Zhelev and Videnov Give Hand to Saving Our Military Enterprises"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently the president conducted a series of meetings with leaders of enterprises, trade companies, and trade unions of the arms producing complex, who complained about the crisis in their branch.

As a result, the Consultative Council on National Security convened on 18 March. The participants in the meeting reviewed the materials that were worked out at the president's office after each meeting, and issued recommendations to the legislative and executive powers. According to the recommendations, the state should work out a long-range strategy on the role and place of the defense industry complex in Bulgaria's national economy, and in guaranteeing the country's national security.

It was not clear whether the participants had discussed the eventual establishment of a department that would be in charge of the military-industrial complex. This idea has become popular in the last few months among our arms producers and merchants.

It was not clear from the communique how Prime Minister Zhan Videnov informed participants about his talks in Moscow related to the possible salvation of the branch. Well-informed sources claim that there is possibly an agreement on this matter.

After the 18 March meeting, journalists were again bamboozled by Ivaylo Trifonov, chief of the President's Office. He was the first to leave the meeting, in order to convey official information to journalists. "Because of the specific character of the issues that were discussed, the communique will be very brief," he said. The journalists preferred to shut their mouths.

Bulgaria: Need for Public Debate on NATO Membership

AU2003121496 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 16-17 Mar 96 p 8

[Commentary by Georgi Apostolov: "Cabinet Darkness"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although Prime Minister Zhan Videnov has not openly declared himself against Bulgaria's membership in NATO, he often quotes with absolute precision Moscow's usual formulas against the eastward expansion of the North Atlantic alliance.

It is no secret for anyone in Brussels that "the new system of European security" means "no" to East European countries' membership in NATO. However, in Sofia it is a secret who actually worked out the position expressed by the prime minister.

In January, the government assumed a commitment to prepare a report on the basis of which further talks would be conducted with NATO on cooperation and eventual membership. Rumor has it that this report has been submitted to the Commission on European Integration, but its contents remain secret from the Bulgarian public. If the document is ready, it would be logical to assume that the position of the prime minister in Moscow reflects its substance. However, is it possible to decide on such an important matter for Bulgaria's national security in a total cabinet darkness without any public discussion?

It is hardly in the country's interest to determine the fate of possible talks with NATO in such a manner. After the position on NATO membership that the prime minister expressed yesterday in Moscow, it would be difficult to convince Brussels that Sofia is prepared openly to discuss all aspects of further relations with Western Europe.

Bulgaria: BSP Prepares for Presidential Elections

AU2003085096 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Council of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the coalition parties are to hold a plenum at the end of March or beginning of April. It is to deal with the implementation of the

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BSP's agrarian policy. This was announced today at the Socialists' regular weekly news conference.

It also was announced that on Friday [22 March] the BSP is to hold a roundtable discussion on the role of the presidential institution during the democratic transition and the political and civic experience of the candidates for the posts of president and vice president.

Today the working group on the preliminary preparations for the forthcoming presidential elections, which was established on 30 January, reported back to the BSP's Executive Bureau. A preliminary variant of a proposal on the principles and attitudes toward nominating a presidential candidate for the Democratic Left was submitted.

The BSP assesses the presidential elections as a key event in 1996. Nikolay Dobrev, member of the commission, said that the presidential institution has exhausted its possibilities. Victory for the Democratic Left is not a goal in itself or a political necessity. In the first round, we will not be seeking a candidate outside the Democratic Left, nor will we support another candidacy, Mr. Dobrev told the news conference.

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Czech Republic: Havel, Kwasniewski Share Views on NATO, EU

LD1903145096 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In Nachod [eastern Bohemia] today, the presidents of the Czech Republic and Poland, Vaclav Havel and Aleksander Kwasniewski, expressed exactly the same views on the prospects of European integration and the entry of Central and East European countries into NATO and the European Union.

At a joint press conference, they also expressed satisfaction with the level of Czech-Polish relations.

Czech Republic: Atomic Law's NATO Entry Impact Examined

AU2003123596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 15 Mar 96 p 2

["Analysis" by Jaroslav Kmenta: "The Draft Atomic Law Submitted by the Government Is Playing Into Russia's Hands"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Security analysts and Defense Ministry experts maintain that the government's draft atomic law, which bans any handling of nuclear weapons on the Republic's territory, has had an unfavorable impact on the talks on enlarging the North Atlantic Alliance toward the East.

In their opinion, it is neither prudent nor expedient for the Republic, before its admission to NATO, to acknowledge the so-called nuclear-free statute in such a manner. That is, although nuclear weapons will never be deployed on the state's territory, the West will lose an important bargaining chip in its diplomatic talks with Russia on NATO enlargement.

"We would like the countries of Central and East Europe to be incorporated into the alliance with all that this entails—that is, militarily too. Russia has again made it clear that it disagrees with military enlargement. What the Prague government is proposing in the atomic law plays more into Russia's interests," said a Western diplomat who has been stationed in Prague for several years.

He cited as an example the most recent comment by the head of Russia's diplomatic corps, Yevgeniy Primakov. He conceded on Monday [11 March] for the first time that Russia is prepared to accept the admission of the Central European countries into NATO, but with the reservation that the alliance must not extend its military structures to these new member states.

At the same time, the Czech Republic has made it absolutely clear several times that it is striving for full membership in NATO—that is, including military membership. "I am opposed to the nuclear-free statute because I am in favor of full membership in NATO," declared First Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas.

Experts from the Institute for International Relations concede that, in the event of entry into NATO, bases for intercontinental strategic nuclear missiles will not be built on the Republic's territory, but, under certain circumstances, an operational background could be created here for fighter aircraft that can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons. "This would most likely involve so-called tactical combat nuclear weapons—that is, missiles with a range of approximately 150 kilometers that are launched from the air against military targets on the battlefield," says an institute employee, Jiri Sedivy.

Security analyst Ivan Gabal, like Western diplomats, considers the stipulation on nuclear weapons in the government's draft atomic law to be a gross error. "Nuclear weapons are an important bargaining chip for us with NATO and Russia. The government's draft atomic law reduces our ability to confront Russian pressure against NATO enlargement, and, on the other hand, we disqualify ourselves with regard to Brussels from the point of view of our capacity to take on the burden of responsibility for full membership in the alliance consistent with the deployment of nuclear weapons," said Gabal previously. Parliament will debate the draft atomic law at the end of March. The Civic Democratic Alliance has already announced that, at the meeting, it will submit an amendment that the Republic not be a country with a nuclear-free statute.

The government has already admitted that it approved the draft atomic law without considering the security aspects it could have. "This indicates, however, that the current Cabinet does not attach sufficient importance to NATO entry, that membership in NATO is not a basic parameter for the government's consideration of key issues," said Ivan Gabal.

Czech Republic: Deputy Minister Urges Greater Army Outlay

AU2003123196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 15 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by "(gag)": "Admission to NATO Means More Money for the Army"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Prague is continuing to count on full incorporation into all of NATO's structures, regardless of Russia's view that Moscow would, under certain circumstances, sanction the North Atlantic Alliance's political enlargement but not its military enlargement.

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"I insist that we decide as a sovereign state on full admission into the alliance," said Deputy Defense Minister Petr Necas (Civic Democratic Party) yesterday. He is a member of the newly established coordination body for the Republic's admission to NATO. In addition to representatives from the Defense and Foreign Ministries, there are officials from the Finance and Industry Ministries in the consultative group.

According to Necas, the time is ripe to increase expenditure on the country's defense. It should amount to 2.2 percent of the GDP for this year, which it about 30.5 billion korunas.

"I am an advocate of increasing the Army's budget. As a politician, I say this openly to citizen voters," declared Necas, who considers a limit of 2.5 percent of the GDP to be the minimum outlay on defense.

Necas thinks that, if the Republic were unwilling to put enough money toward defense in the future, the country's admission to NATO could be slowed down. "By making a modest financial affirmation, we are actually saying that we do not care about the country's defense and that we do not want to participate in defending the values of Western countries," added Necas.

Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus criticized the Army's economic management last November and refused to resolve its difficult financial situation by merely increasing its budget.

Deputy Minister Necas identified with the prime minister's point of view when he said that greater expenditure on the Army will not be achieved without transparent economic management. "It is no longer possible for us to keep shoveling billion after billion into the Army without anyone's knowing where they have gone."

Czech Republic: Parties Focus on NATO Membership

96CH0055E Prague PRAGUE POST in English 20 Feb 96 p 11

[Article by Daniel Kumermann: "NATO Issue Becoming Bigger on the Home Front and in Russia"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Two events—one domestic, one foreign—have brought NATO to the forefront of the Czech political scene in recent weeks. Though these events may seem to have little in common, together they make up one picture.

The main local opposition force, the Czech Social Democratic Party (CSSD), introduced its campaign platform on Jan. 20. In it, the CSSD restated the pro-NATO stance that they assumed at a party conference some six months ago. This time, however, they added a clause that NATO membership should be decided by the general population in a referendum.

This is an obvious compromise between distinctly pro-NATO "modernists" and "traditionalists" who do not like any military pact whatsoever, but who at the same time recognize that most of the population leans toward NATO membership.

This slight shift in the CSSD's policy created a stir on the political scene, and prompted practically every party to pitch in a statement of its own. Only those two parties that usually don't make much sense anyway—the far-right Republicans and the Communists—came out with a complete rejection of joining the alliance. All the others accept NATO as important for the Czech Republic's security and differ only on the technicalities of joining. Parties to the left of the CSSD are in favor of a referendum, and all those on the right are against it.

So the battle lines have been drawn, the trenches dug and the weapons readied. Yet the other NATO-related event could make all these preparations seem like much ado about nothing, at least when viewed from outside the Czech Republic.

On the same day that the Czech media reported the CSSD's new NATO approach, they also carried information about a study by the influential Russian Committee for Foreign and Defense Policy. It claims that if NATO incorporates some of the Central European countries—that is, moves closer to Russia—it will damage Russia's relations with the West, creating a "cold peace," and will bring about a rise in Russian nationalism.

The study was concluded just a few months before the Russian general elections, which produced a parliament that sent shivers down Europe's spine. Shortly after the elections, President Boris Yeltsin, who is expected to counterbalance this communist- and nationalist-dominated assembly, gave orders that led to the cold-blooded killing of hostages in Dagestan.

Another warning signal is that the study was signed by people who are considered to be liberals and democrats. Their oft-repeated logic sounds infallible: The democratic forces in Russia are too weak and need any support they can get. Any negative signal from the West—NATO enlargement, for instance—can only strengthen the forces of past evil and weaken those of future good. They suggest that their political allies in post-communist countries, in pushing for NATO membership, are actually driving a knife into the backs of Russian democrats.

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A few days after news of the study appeared in the Czech press, President Yeltsin reiterated his unequivocal opposition to NATO enlargement. Then, on Feb. 3, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Andrej Kokoshin warned that NATO expansion would lead to a "negative, if not painful, reaction in Russian society," and proposed separating NATO from Russia with a Central European neutral buffer zone.

Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec visited alliance headquarters in Brussels on Jan. 29 to discuss Czech-NATO cooperation thus far, and to gain some outlook for the future. He got exactly what he should have expected: elated words about how well the Czechs are doing, and not much else. As he had many times before, Zieleniec heard that NATO membership for Czechs is just around the corner. This time frame, however, seems open to interpretation.

To view the scene, putting Central European fears and emotions aside, it's easy to understand this ambiguity. Unless the situation changes dramatically, there surely isn't much reason for the West to risk creating tension with an unpredictable (super)power, which Russia remains. After all, NATO spent years developing a defense strategy based on a Europe split down the middle. But geopolitical changes demand painful changes in strategy, too. It is basically a tug-of-war between the West's feelings of responsibility for new democracies developing in Central Europe and an awareness of the lingering East-West divide that began with the Yalta agreement among the wartime Allies in 1945. These new democracies can only hope that, in the long run, their bigger sibling will understand that they can be useful.

In the meantime, however, Central European fears and emotions are here to stay. We can be sure that the NATO question will be an important issue in the upcoming election campaign. Given the laws of absurdity that govern human nature, we can also be sure that the more important the issue becomes, the less Czechs and other Central Europeans will be able to influence it.

Czech Republic: Klaus-Kwasniewski Rapprochement Interpreted

96CH0053A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 6 Feb 96 p 8

[Article by Dusan Trestik: "We and the Poles Need Each Other"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first person with whom Vaclav Klaus met in Davos and with whom he made ostentatiously friendly contacts was postcommunist Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski. Both emphatically confirmed that their priority interests were in mutual collaboration. Kwasniewski surely appreciated the support Klaus thus gave him as a result of his reputation for being an exemplary reformer on his campaign trip about European capitals aimed at "acceptance into the salon" of European statesmen.

Vaclav Klaus had already welcomed Kwasniewski's election with considerable relief; not perhaps because he was rejoicing over yet an additional victory of the postcommunist left, but because he finally has a sensible partner. The postcommunist right in Central Europe tends to look as though the political scene is swarming with tens of [spokeswoman of a marginal Czech right-wing party] Alena Hromadkas and their bitterly quarreling righteous cronies (no standard political parties here), shouting out old hoary slogans of national paranoia under clouds of incense, while going for each other's jugular. The old right-wing dissent movement has long died in this eccentric environment and (with the exception of a few individuals) has understandably lost its credibility. It is necessary to add to this cauldron the abundant crop of postsocialist populists in the style of Vlado Meciar and to top the mixture with Lech of the Great Ego, riding astride the white horse of Marshal Pilsudsky into a Central European NATO substitute, in order for us to acquire a complete picture of this wax museum. A festival of this exotic political folklore was to Be held at Visegrad—of blissful memory. Who then could be surprised at Vaclav Klaus? After all, what is left is just a number of pragmatic arrangements from the old days, which seem to work—and this is also the reason that a society that is consolidating itself and the majority of which is already overcoming the shock of transformation votes for them.

So, finally, we have the opportunity of dealing with a sensible Polish (and also a Hungarian) representation. This is one item of good news, albeit in an unconcerned, simple, rightist-leftist perspective, which, on the face of it, looks somewhat like a paradox.

We and the Poles need each other. We need each other as neighbors and as economic partners, but also as partners in grand politics. It is not only Poland that stands between Germany and Russia, and it is not only Poland that has had its most difficult historical experiences with these two nations. Reports seeped out of the meeting in Davos indicating that discussions dealt primarily with Germany. Understandably, the ever more discernible efforts on the part of the Bonn Government over the recent months to get rid of anything related to the legal statutes of the Federal Republic as a vanquished nation, and the resulting dangerous efforts to revise the results of World War II, impact both us and also Poland. Perhaps Poland more so because the Potsdam Accords, which are currently being rejected in

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Bonn, are the basis for the current Polish border on the Oder and Neisse Rivers. And voices reviving questions of property entitlements on the part of expellees from Polish territory are being heard from Bonn at an ever increasing volume.

What began as an internal political matter—the petty concern for the votes of Sudeten German voters who support the CSU [Christian Social Union]—now, in the light of the events of recent weeks, tends to look more like the beginning of an overall revision of the "Ostpolitik" policies of Brandt and Schmidt, aimed particularly at Poland. It seems as though Germany had interpreted the approval by the Great Powers of its unification as approval to annul the results of the war and is now attempting to settle down in this new position of a definitively exculpated "undefeated" nation. Although Kohl was not invited to Normandy to celebrate the anniversary of the allied invasion, a move by which the allies signaled what they think about this "exoneration"—and although other celebrations of the end of the war anniversary held last year had similar outcomes—the more readily, however, is Bonn attempting to create a status quo according to its own sense.

We are the ones who pay the price because this new course of events is obviously related to the sudden turnaround made by Klaus Kinkel during the negotiations about the Czecho-German declaration. Poland must also feel rather bad in this regard. But this also has to do with all of Europe, which is sensitive to all signs of the renewal of traditional German Great Power policy. We could appeal to this sensitivity when referring to our difficulties with Germany, but they would hardly seem worthwhile to anyone, particularly to the United States, in terms of supporting us. Most likely we would lose more than we could gain from this politically. However, it is something else when Poland with its 40 million inhabitants joins us in our reservations, particularly in view of its strategic-political importance, which cannot be overlooked by anyone. Any, even the most insignificant, doubt being cast on Poland's position in postwar Europe (let us not forget that the entire state shifted hundreds of kilometers westward after 1944, with a gain for Russia and at the expense of Germany—something that was confirmed specifically by the Potsdam Agreement) must be perceived with great sensitivity as a potential fuse for the serious conflict. Moreover, Poland also has an absolutely undeniable (contrary to ourselves), generally recognized moral right of being a victim of the war, particularly of Germany.

There is no need to doubt that this was precisely what Vaclav Klaus discussed with Aleksander Kwasniewski and that their deliberately manifested agreement had to do with more than just current neighborly questions. However, it will be some time yet before we see what comes of this Klaus diplomatic step, but, even so, it is already the second good item of news today. It means that we shall not yield and play Bonn's game by proclaiming that the expulsion was "illegal," with all its legal consequences that automatically flow from this step (as demanded recently, for example, by MLADA FRONTA DNES and as seems apparent from the viewpoint expressed by Jiri Dientsbier). We shall not thus support Bonn's efforts to bring about the factual recognition of the status of Germany as an "undefeated" state, in exchange for vague promises that the Sudeten German card will not be played, promises that can be withdrawn at any time. On the contrary, we have, thanks to Klaus's alert diplomatic step, a decent chance to fashion our bilateral give-and-take with Germany into something far broader.

In recent times, we have persistently pointed out that the Bonn government's identification with the demands of the Sudeten Germans is one-sided, aimed only at the small Czech Republic, whereas identical demands by expellees from Polish territory have long since been tabled by the German Government in view of the good relationship with Poland. Chancellor Kohl clearly drew conclusions from this and clearly indicated that even in this regard he wishes to be consistent and would not permit the results of the old "Ostpolitik" with respect to Poland to be placed in doubt. But he obviously made a mistake—perhaps even a fatal one. He did this primarily in regard to how he sees the configuration of not only a unified, but also an easterly expanded Europe. Probably few people will believe that the currently uniting Europe should have a different standing from that of an expanded Europe, about which Kohl clearly indicates by his attitudes that it should be, in one form or another, directed by an "undefeated" Germany while he forces us to recognize this as an accomplished fact. In its final consequences, we would thus become one of the "Euroregions" in Kohl's "Federal Republic of Europe."

Some in our country would find this quite pleasing, under the good Czech slogan of "Zimmer Frei," or under the Hapsburg clerical slogan of "Central Pan-Europe," or under the slogan of the [commentator from the centrist weekly RESPEKT] Dolezal's "political realism"; fortunately, there are very few of them. In Poland, this would not be very popular at all with anyone. How West Europe will stand on this issue depends on it; however, it is doubtful that Mr. Kohl's actions in the East could please it.

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Czech Republic: Presence of Russian Spies in Country Denied

96CH0055D Prague PRAGUE POST in English 20 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Siegfried Mortkowitz: "Russia Denies It Has Its Spies Working in Prague"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Russian Embassy in Prague has denounced a press report claiming that the Czech Security Information Service (BIS) has information that the Russian intelligence service is actively working to destabilize Czech politics.

According to the Feb. 7 article in the Czech daily MLADA FRONTA DNES, the secret BIS report expressed fears that Russian agents would release compromising information in the Czech Republic before the May 31-June 1 general elections that could damage some political parties or their leaders.

The article appeared amid reports that the Russian intelligence service had been responsible for leaking confidential information about former Polish Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy. Oleksy resigned Jan. 24, following allegations that he spied for Moscow.

Calling the article "clearly provocative," Russian Ambassador Alexander Lebedev vigorously denied the report. Lebedev called on the Czechs "to look for skeletons in (their) own closets and not be influenced by specters used frequently by both Russian and Czech mass media, and some politicians, to frighten us."

The Russian ambassador said that "Russia has no intention...of interfering in the internal affairs of the Czech Republic." And he criticized the newspaper article for actually doubling the number of Russian diplomats currently stationed in the country.

Insinuating that the report may play on Czech fears about Russia, Lebedev cited the case of the Good Soldier Svejk, the character from the beloved short stories of Jaroslav Hasek. "Inevitably, one comes to remember that even Svejk was accused of being a Russian spy."

A Foreign Ministry spokesman told news agency CTK that neither Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec nor anyone else in the ministry had seen any information regarding this matter. And Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus told journalists that he has never received any reports from the BIS about such activities on the part of Russian intelligence. He also said that the government was not dealing with the speculation.

"It is embarrassing that a top secret (BIS) report is being commented on by the media," Klaus added.

But while many Czech politicians publicly denied receiving BIS information about such activities, a highly placed government official privately admitted the report did contain the warning.

Czech Republic: Tighter Controls on BIS Debated

96CH0055C Prague PRAGUE POST in English 20 Feb 96 p 2

[Article by Jan Stojaspal: "Coalition Split on Security Oversight"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Squabbles over how to tighten controls on the Czech Republic's intelligence services have caused the latest in a series of rifts in the governing coalition.

The opening volley of a fresh round of pre-election accusations within the coalition came from Jan Kalvoda, chairman of the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), who stated that no "proper and effective" supervision of the intelligence services exists.

Responding to the government's Jan. 31 rebuff on an ODA bill that would have significantly stepped up parliamentary checks on the country's four intelligence services, Kalvoda said that current supervision consists of merely accepting what intelligence chiefs report.

Of the four, only the Security Intelligence Service (BIS) is accountable to an independent parliamentary commission as well as to the government.

The other branches are the Bureau of Foreign Relations and Intelligence (UZSI), the Intelligence Service of the General Staff (ZSGS) and the counter-espionage Defense Intelligence Service (VOZ).

While fellow coalition members in the Christian Democratic Union-Czech People's Party (KDU-CSL) backed Kalvoda's Feb. 4 statement, his attack raised eyebrows in the rest of the governing coalition—the Vaclav Klaus-led Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which is working on a less strict proposal, and its close ally the Christian Democratic Party (KDS).

Ivan Pilip, chairman of the KDS, dismissed Kalvoda's claims as groundless, and said that controls are sufficient.

The latest coalition skirmish coincides with the leak of a secret BIS annual report claiming that Russian intelligence services are gathering compromising information about Czech politicians in an attempt to influence the upcoming elections.

Under the ODA's proposal, all four intelligence services would be controlled by a five-member parliamentary

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committee and a three-member supervisory board with expanded executive powers.

"It is not enough to have checks on their activities, but also on their organization, spending and the use of surveillance equipment," said Oldrich Kuzilek, an ODA member of Parliament's defense and security committee and one of the authors of the ODA bill.

Kuzilek warned that the BIS could be misused as a political tool. "We already have indications that the ODS has intelligence that the other coalition parties don't have," he said.

Kalvoda accused the BIS last year of illegally collecting information about the ODA and deliberately leaking it to the media, in connection with the investigation of Kreditni a prumyslova banka, from which the ODA borrowed money.

Pavel Severa, a People's party deputy on the current six-member BIS committee, said he has received little cooperation from BIS director, Stanislav Devaty.

"He will not give us access to current files, and it takes a lot of effort to nudge the service into providing information about old cases," Severa said.

Devaty declined to comment.

Cestmir Chaloupka, a deputy director of the Interior Ministry's legal department, who has been working on the ODS proposal, agreed that the controls need to be tightened, but "it can't be (a system) where the Parliament not only passes laws, but also acts as a court tribunal and government."

Under the government proposal, all four intelligence services would be controlled by a parliamentary committee, and its members would have a right to question individual employees of the services, not only their chiefs. However, their access to information would remain limited.

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Slovakia: Kovac's Office Reacts to Meciar Refusal To Meet

AU1903153596 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 16 Mar 96 p 1

[Report by TASR: "Why the Prime Minister and the President Have Not Met"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—At the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia rally [on 7 March] and in his regular Friday interview for Slovak Radio, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar announced that, following the president's refusal to appoint Olga Keltosova ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United Nations, it is impossible for him to meet the president. This is stated, among other things, in a statement by the Office of the President of the Slovak Republic, made available to TASR by its Press Section. The statement goes on to say that, on 8 February 1996, the president sent a letter to the prime minister, inviting him to a meeting on 15 or 16 February. On 15 February Anna Nagyova, director of the prime minister's secretariat, announced by telephone that the prime minister would not be able to come for health reasons. The government's proposal to nominate Olga Keltosova for the diplomatic post was delivered to the president's secretariat on 22 February. On 23 February, the president again invited the prime minister to a meeting by means of a letter. On 6 March, a female employee of the prime minister's secretariat announced that the prime minister was unable to come and that he would announce the reasons in writing (this has not happened to date). On 7 March, the president announced his negative position regarding Olga Keltosova's appointment. The president intentionally delayed his decision on filling the diplomatic post with the United Nations in New York because he logically assumed that his talk with the prime minister would concern also this matter. Hence, the truth is that the prime minister rejected a meeting with the head of state prior to the president's rejection of Minister Olga Keltosova's candidacy. The discrepancies, in terms of chronology and substance, in Vladimir Meciar's pronouncements have probably been caused by his great workload. However, even after these events, the president of the Slovak Republic has not changed his position that the resumption of communication among constitutional officials is inevitable if there is an interest in building Slovakia as a democratic, law-governed state of free citizens that wants to become integrated into the EU and NATO.

Slovakia: Miklosko: Meciar Shows 'His Standard of Culture'

AU2003104996 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 16 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "Frantisek Miklosko: Vladimir Meciar's Reply to My Interpellation Conforms With His Standard of Culture"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Within the framework of interpellations at the 13th meeting of Parliament at the beginning of February, Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Deputy Frantisek Miklosko addressed to Prime Minister Meciar 10 questions regarding the alleged participation by the Slovak Information Service in the affair of the theft of the triptych in Banska Bystrica [which led to the search of the residence of Bishop Rudolf Balaz, president of the Slovak Bishops' Conference]. In his last question, which reacted to Vladimir Meciar's statement at a Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] really calling in question the physical attack on Frantisek Miklosko by an unidentified perpetrator, Miklosko asked when Vladimir Meciar last took a walk through Bratislava alone at night. We are publishing the prime minister's reply word for word.

"I am a lawyer by education, I have the title of doctor of law and two honorary doctorates. However, none of them is in psychiatry, so I am unable to help or advise you regarding your visions. Not so long ago, I walked along a street alone and I even used a public toilet. Excuse me, but I did not know that I was supposed to report this directly to you personally, or to the KDH headquarters. And now let me add something. I am a free man. I go where I want to go, with whom I want to go, and when I want to go, and, as long as I do not violate the laws of this state, this is none of your business, you an all-hating majesty. Meciar."

In an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, Frantisek Miklosko assessed the letter by saying that "the prime minister is apparently confusing the atmosphere of [HZDS] rallies with the parliamentary atmosphere, but this probably conforms with his general standard of culture." According to Frantisek Miklosko, the fact that he did not reply to the questions is typical for Vladimir Meciar. It goes without saying that he, Miklosko, cannot accept this letter as a reply to his interpellation.

He commented similarly also on Prosecutor General Michal Valo's reply to his interpellation: "Though he wrote with a refinement that cannot be compared with Mr. Meciar's letter, he, too, did not reply to the questions I had addressed to him." The interpellation concerned the procedure by the Regional Prosecutor's Of-

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fice in Banska Bystrica in investigating the theft of the triptych. The third addressee of the interpellation, Interior Minister Ludovit Hudek, did not even bother to reply to Frantisek Miklosko's questions, which concerned the role of Hudek's people in the affair. "This is the style of the whole present policy—one does not reply to unpleasant questions," the KDH deputy said.

Slovakia: SDL Head on Opposition to Entry Into Coalition

AU2003100196 Bratislava SME in Slovak 18 Mar 96 p 2

[Report on interview with SDL Chairman Peter Weiss by "sp"; place and date not given: "Peter Weiss: Only a Lunatic Would Agree With the SDL's Joining the Present Coalition Quartet"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—"The Slovak Republic needs a change of the method of government, as well as a change of the contents of government policy. We have not noticed anything that would signal the interest of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in such a change. The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL, is not pushing to get where it has not been invited," SDL Chairman Peter Weiss told SME in reply to the question whether one of the themes of the SDL assembly in April would be the possible commencement of talks with the HZDS on the party's entry into the government coalition. According to Weiss, the SDL Republican Council has decided to wait with any statement until the party's members deliver their opinion on this issue. "We know from sociological surveys that 72 percent of potential SDL voters do not trust the HZDS," Peter Weiss said. Reacting to the prime minister's rejection of the coalition's enlargement at the expense of the Association of Workers of Slovakia or the Slovak National Party [SNS], Weiss said: "Only a lunatic would agree with the SDL joining the ruling quartet and endorsing thereby the existing method of governing. The SNS, whose leading representatives have repeatedly tried to rehabilitate President Jozef Tiso and the Ludakist fascistic regime of the wartime Slovak state, is not a partner, with whom the SDL could be in a government coalition."

Slovakia: Official on Priorities, Structure of Army Budget

AU1903155196 Bratislava OBRANA in Slovak 16 Mar 96 p 6

[Interview with Colonel Jozef Zadzora, director of the Slovak Defense Ministry's Economic Policy Section, by "m"-signed correspondent; place and date not given: "With Colonel Jozef Zadzora About Priorities in Dividing the Army's Budget"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Dreams are one thing, and reality something completely different. This is how one could very briefly characterize the 13.5 billion korunas [Sk] appropriated for the defense department this year. The imaginary belt around our Army has been tightened another notch. This is also confirmed by the replies given by Colonel Engineer Jozef Zadzora, candidate of sciences, director of the Economy Policy Section at the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic, to our questions.*

[OBRANA] It is hard to say whether it would be appropriate to congratulate you on the decision of the Collegium [Kolegium] of the Minister of Defense of the Slovak Republic to recommend to the minister of defense of the Slovak Republic for approval the proposed expenditures within the framework of the set binding tasks of the Slovak Army budget. Does the Army budget permit the fulfillment of commitments arising for Slovakia from international agreements?

[Zadzora] With regard to the international commitments of the Slovak Republic, priority must be given to the commitments arising from the implementation of the Slovak Republic's individual plan within the framework of the Partnership for Peace program, in which we pledged to implement a program of increasing the compatibility and interoperability of communications and command systems. Another commitment, one that is particularly important for us economists, is to make the military budget more transparent. We have set aside more than Sk0.5 billion for all these purposes. [passage omitted]

[OBRANA] Is the structure of our budget identical with the structure of other countries' army budgets?

[Zadzora] The budgets of individual countries differ in their structure. [passage omitted] This makes it quite difficult to compare the size of individual budgets. We regularly participate in talks of the NATO Economic Committee on this issue. At these talks, ways are being sought to standardize the methodology of assessing the size of the budget.

[OBRANA] What is the size of our budget in relation to GDP, compared with the neighboring states?

[Zadzora] Comparability does not exist, in reality. For example, all the former socialist states in central Europe have a budget of between 2 and 3 percent of GDP. The Czechs have slightly over 2.4 percent, we have 2.6 percent. The problem is at what stage of its development each army finds itself. After all, the Army of the Slovak Republic has been built for only slightly over three

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years. In this case, investment expenditure must exceed by a multiple the investments of an army that is merely undergoing transformation.

[OBRANA] The defense department's budget represents 7.6 percent of the Slovak Republic's budget. Is this enough, a lot, or too little?

[Zadzora] I can only present my personal opinion, because everyone can have his own reply to this question. In my opinion, it is very little. On the other hand, we have to consider the potentials of our state.

[OBRANA] How much would our Army really need?

[Zadzora] Our Army's requirements amount to roughly Sk24 billion at present. This sum would allow us to improve the quality of training, equipment, and the system of command in our Army so as to live up to the Policy Statement of the Government of the Slovak Republic, that is, to transform it into a small but well-trained and well-equipped army.

[OBRANA] The difference between actual demands and the reality is more than Sk10 billion.

[Zadzora] There is nothing left for us but to make cuts. The first thing from which we have had to back away was modernization. The decisive part of resources is spent on securing the social conditions of army life: food, clothing, salaries, and such, including energy. All other expenditures have had to recede into the background. In terms of figures this means that, for Army members to be able to live, we must take from our budget the sum of Sk7.3 billion.

[OBRANA] The first minister of defense of the Slovak Republic used to assure everyone that we could still afford to pay salaries. Will this be the case also this year?

[Zadzora] We do have money for salaries and pay. This is, of course, one of the priorities. Besides, this year we also have almost Sk500 million for building and purchasing new apartments. [passage omitted]

[OBRANA] Which other priorities did you have to consider?

[Zadzora] Besides the aforementioned legal claims of the people, we have had to provide for the most essential repairs of equipment for the Army to be capable of combat. Next came our international commitments, and the maintenance of buildings and equipment. [passage omitted]

[OBRANA] Is it apparent from the budget how much money is allocated per soldier, platoon, company, battalion, and so forth?

[Zadzora] The present structure of the budget does not permit such a specification. This will be possible only next year when the costs of other management components will be set apart. We will then know how much we have appropriated for the ground troops, for the air force, for military schools, and so forth.

[OBRANA] In other words, only double entry bookkeeping [podvojne uctovnictvo] will make it possible to specify the resources spent per soldier, unit, and type of troops?

[Zadzora] Double entry bookkeeping will have to be introduced. The Army has until now been exempted from the generally valid norms. Next year we will introduce double entry bookkeeping on a trial basis, and in 1988 it will probably be introduced fully. This is a very complicated issue, which is associated with a large number of measures in the sphere of appraisal of Army property. It is necessary to prepare the necessary projects, to retrain people, to print new forms, and so forth. This work is still ahead of us. [passage omitted]

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Hungary: Horn Expects Stabilization To Continue

LD1903151996 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1400 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Gyula Horn does not agree with the views of the Hajos group [informal workshop that calls for a return to the original left-wing values] of the Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] that the coalition agreement should be revised. He is of the view that HSP and SZDSZ [Alliance of Free Democrats] had agreed on every issue. At his regular televised press briefing this morning, the prime minister said the government's composition was not expected to change until 1998. He stressed that stabilization should be continued, but not through measures similar to last year's [reference to the austerity program drawn up by former Finance Minister Lajos Bokros]. Gyula Horn expects the forthcoming HSP congress [29-31 March] to confirm its endorsement for the present economic policy.

Hungary: Csintalan on MSZP Organizational Problems

AU2003130296 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 18 Mar 96 p 9

[Interview with Sandor Csintalan, executive deputy chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Tibor J. Keri; place and date not given: "I Do Not Wish To Be First Deputy Chairman in Any Form"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Keri] What are your views on the Budapest deputies' proposal that the congress should elect a deputy party chairman [elnokhelyettes]?

[Csintalan] Today it seems that the party's majority supports this idea. If the general view in the party finds that this position can improve the work and can give a bigger weight to those members of the executive committee who are not government members, then this initiative has to be supported. Although I do not approve of this proposal.

Several Solutions

[Keri] Why?

[Csintalan] Because the problems can be solved in many ways. In my view, even if this office is set up, many things will still have to be changed. First of all, it has to be achieved that the governing party's executive committee should be the political coordinating forum at which the government's socialist members, and representatives of the parliamentary group and the party organizations come to an agreement on the most important political issues. This mainly depends on the intentions and attitude of the participants, rather than on setting up a new position. Therefore, in my view, it will be of decisive importance what membership the congress elects into the executive committee. We have to elect an executive committee in which the party's dominant politicians, who can achieve agreement on political issues simply through their presence, are members.

[Keri] Why would the position of deputy party chairman be a solution?

[Csintalan] Those who proposed this suggested that the deputy party chairman should be given the rights of a party chairman. Therefore, he should have the possibility of running the executive committee even when the party chairman-prime minister is away. [passage omitted]

[Keri] In your view, how many members should the new executive committee have?

[Csintalan] It is not important whether the executive committee has 11 or 18 members. The problem with the current executive committee is not the fact that it has 18 members.

Trust Is Needed

[Keri] Then what?

[Csintalan] In my view, the basic problem is that we did not manage to act together with the necessary emphasis to achieve coordinating various political issues in the executive committee. This is the responsibility of the all members of the executive committee, rather than of only one or two people. I trust that this will succeed in the next executive committee. I also hope that an atmosphere of confidence will evolve in the executive committee which could not have evolved in the past two years because of the often mentioned leaks. The executive committee is a forum for the exchange and coordination of information.

[Keri] Were these leaks harmful?

[Csintalan] They were!

[Keri] Why?

[Csintalan] In the given situations, they harmed the negotiating positions of the party or the prime minister, even vis-a-vis the coalition partner. If we cannot achieve open discussions of the issues because the various stances are made public within minutes, then this hinders the joint consideration of issues. I add that the politicians, rather than the press, are responsible for the leaks. The public is interested in the decisions rather than the debates. However, if people only read about the debates, they might get the impression that "these do not

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know what they want." A governing party cannot permit itself the luxury of appearing to be hesitant, nervous, or uncertain. However, it cannot permit itself not to discuss alternatives, either.

Hungary: Situation of Opposition Parties Analyzed

96CH0032A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 23 Dec 95 p 7

[Article by Jozsef Debreczeni, parliamentary representative of the Hungarian Democratic Forum from 1990-94: "The Opposition's Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] This year has not been a good one for the opposition. It has been unable to fulfill its most important mission: to present itself as a united and credible political force capable of forming a government, an alternative to the MSZP-SZDSZ [Hungarian Socialist Party-Alliance of Free Democrats] coalition.

Yet the coalition has perfectly played into the opposition's hands—by being divisive and lacking credibility, sometimes by appearing to be in power but not in government. The opposition parties, too, did their bit. They scolded the coalition for failure to fulfill its promises, dissected the coalition's legislative bills and reproached it for the bills it had failed to introduce. They called attention to the coalition's actions that had been ill-advised, unconstitutional, or antisocial. They criticized and protested, accused and exposed. There were reasons aplenty to do so. And yet, the opposition parties have been unable to turn disappointment in the government into support for themselves. They did not know how to win over, to rally into a camp, the growing masses disillusioned with the government.

One wonders, why?

Reasons both external and internal have played a role in this. Foremost among the external reasons has been the coalition's two-thirds parliamentary majority. The opposition has no constitutional means at its disposal to curb the political will of the government's majority. Only the coalition parties' moderation and the conflicts of interest existing between them can limit the absolute assertion of the coalition's power aspirations. That makes for very weak checks and balances.

The president of the Republic, elected from the ranks of the SZDSZ, was a political ally of the opposition parties throughout the previous election cycle, but now the present opposition cannot count on him in any respect (see, for instance, the appointment of the presidents for Hungarian Radio and Hungarian Television, respectively).

The situation is similar with the press. At the time, the press had fomented and organized dissatisfaction with the government; today, it is striving to moderate and channel such dissatisfaction. The preponderance of the postsocialist and leftist-liberal majority in the media exceeds even their parliamentary majority, except that the ratio between them in parliament is the inverse of their ratio in the media. At the cost of horrible struggles and losses of prestige, the previous government was able to achieve only by the end of the election cycle the appointment of progovernment(?) bosses at the institutions, over mostly antigovernment staffs. The present government had no trouble at all in placing, within weeks, loyal bosses over equally loyal subordinates. In Hungary, after a four-year period of the opposition press's dominance, there arrived 18 months ago the reign of a moderately progovernment and massively antiopposition press.

The hopeless financial situation of the opposition parties is likewise a serious obstacle to their effective functioning. A subsidy from the state is their main source of income. Obsolescence and debt are all that remain now of the assets (party headquarters) once allocated to them. But the MSZP inherited the assets of the onetime state party and has been able to salvage a substantial proportion of those assets. And the MSZP's coalition partner can count on almost unlimited cash donations from domestic and international donors. Thus, the members of the ruling coalition are not tied to the umbilical cord of state subsidies, and their two-thirds majority enables them to cut that cord at any time they wish.

The next reasons, still an external one, is that the opposition parties are not deeply imbedded in society. It can be said with some generalization that the MDF [Hungarian Democratic Forum] and the KDNP [Christian Democratic People's Party] are the parties of strata that became socialized in the precommunist era, while the socialization of the strata supporting FIDESZ [Federation of Young Democrats] took place in the postcommunist era. Through the middle-class values these parties uphold, it would be difficult to appeal to what lies between them; that is, various elites of the Kadar era, and its depoliticized and largely demoralized masses. Dr. Torgyan's successes illustrate what can be effective in the case of the latter.

Turning now to the internal reasons for the opposition parties' weakness, we cannot dispense with a scholarly political-science comparison with Western party systems. We know of three models in this field. The first model is that of two parties alternating in government. Typical of this system is stable government, due to a majority of one of the parties. There are no extreme parties, the political contest tends toward the center, for the

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voters at the center. For that reason, and for the possibility of forming the government, the parties conduct an intensive but moderate campaign, without irresponsible promises. The parties treat their conflicts pragmatically, and ideology plays a very modest role. (Great Britain and the United States.)

The second model is that of a moderate multiparty system. The number of parties varies between three and five, divided into center-left, center, and center-right parties. Coalitions alternate in government, with the center acting as the tip of the balance. There are no opposition parties on both sides, no extreme or antiestablishment parties. The contest here, too, is pragmatic and moderate. (Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden.)

The third model is that of a polarized multiparty system. The political arena is fragmented, and there are sharp conflicts. The coalitions are unstable, with opposition parties on both sides, and there are antiestablishment parties. There is overbidding, the centripetal contest is intense. To counter the vote-absorbing effect of the fringe parties, the center-right and the center-left are forced to engage in "outward" politicking (Germany's Weimar Republic, for example).

The party system in Hungary is on the borderline between the moderate multiparty system and the polarized one. In any case, it is a peculiar, transitional phenomenon. On the left there is only one parliamentary party, the MSZP. But on the right there are four parties, FIDESZ included. (Until the summer of 1994 it seemed that the SZDSZ and FIDESZ might form the center. But the former has shifted leftward, and the latter has closed ranks with the right. The gap of differences between them has widened.)

The Social Democratic Party, a potential rival of the MSZP on the left, has disappeared. The Workers' Party is not a parliamentary party. The liberal economic policies of the ruling Socialists would give the Workers' Party wide scope to mount the dissatisfaction within society. Its situation would offer the Workers' Party the role of the typically irresponsible opposition party, since it has no hope of ever winning an election, but mounting the dissatisfaction would be ideal from the viewpoint of its chances to enter parliament. Yet the party led by Thurmer is very low-keyed and refrains from social demagoguery. Like some pacifist movement in Sweden, it is gathering signatures for a referendum on NATO membership. Its mission is to harm the MSZP as little as possible, and to help it as much as it can. As the "official successor party" (having inherited just the name and an embarrassing past, but not the assets), by its very existence it continues to legitimize the MSZP. In any case, the government does not have to cope with an opposition party on the left.

On the right, however, the government has as many as three kinds of opponents. First there is a responsible parliamentary opposition (FIDESZ, the MDF, and the KDNP) that would be capable of forming a government and is able, therefore, to offer an alternative. Then there is an irresponsible, promising-bidding opposition still in parliament (Torgyan's Smallholders Party). And finally there is an antiestablishment opposition party outside parliament (Csurka and the MIEP [Hungarian Justice and Life Party]). The last two parties are exerting a gradually increasing absorption effect on the center-right that feels compelled to join the contest and assume a tougher tone, because the fringe parties are taking too many voters away from it. But if the center right did this, it would be swept sooner or later from its position of a reliable alternative government. As the KDNP's leaning towards the fringe indicates, that party has already fallen into this trap. This whole lot, from Gyula Thurmer to the onetime three/threes [agents of the Interior Ministry's Department III, Section 3] who now head the parties on the far right, seem to have been invented. And they function accordingly.

The right is split. What seemed at one time merely as drifting to the extreme right (Torgyan's departure from the coalition, and Csurka's expulsion from the MDF) has grown in the meantime into a strong political pole. This pole is exerting a magnetic effect not only on between 20-25 percent of voters, but also on a small part of the MDF and a large part of the KDNP. The left is the real winner and beneficiary in this process and, of course, is doing everything possible to advance it. The left has sufficient political, economic, and media muscle to do so.

The fragmented right presents the worst picture: a hopeless and disillusioning picture of interparty and intraparty intrigues, accusations, and struggle for positions. This picture has been rendered even darker by the spectacular failure of the Civic Alliance.

Obviously, half the parties are having leadership crises. The only exceptions are FIDESZ and—in their fashion—the Smallholders and the MIEP. FIDESZ is the party that has a chairman. The FKGP [Independent Smallholders Party] is the one where the chairman has a party. The MDF and the KDNP lack a real leader, at least a leader who would be able to integrate the parties and who would enjoy undisputed authority.

If the center-right does not wish to abandon integration—i.e., its prospects in the next elections—it must not delay much longer choosing its No. 1 man, its prime minister designate. The center-right needs

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a politician who has a great intellect and a definite concept; is able to captivate his audience at rallies or in debate; is an excellent speaker and debater as well as organizer; who knows how to handle people, how to clash and compromise; who is a glutton for work, has strong nerves and an immense tolerance of conflicts and failures; who knows how to make decisions and dares to make them; and who is not only talented but a born politician as well.

The opposition today has one such man. I would hardly be putting him at risk by writing down his name. After all, the other side knows very well who is their only serious and real political opponent. That is why they are taking potshots at him whenever he dares to move. And that is why they are attempting to discredit him in every possible way.

And his name is well known in his own camp as well. At the giant rally that Ferenc Madl, the presidential candidate, held in the Erkel Theater, the three party chairmen were asked to appear on stage. When Viktor Orban stepped on stage after Lajos Fur and Gyorgy Giczy, the applause from the audience—it was 90 percent MDF and KDNP—was twice louder and three times longer than the applause before him.

If by 1996 the leaders of the center-right are unable to subordinate their personal ambitions and the perceived interests of their parties to the requirements of integration, then they will be ensuring for a long time to come the hegemonistic power of the left in Hungary, the perpetuation of the postsocialist era of "preserving by abolishing."

Or else Torgyan will come.

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B-H: Prlic Assesses Prospects for Federation

AU2003114996 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 9 Mar 96

[Interview in two installments with Jadranko Prlic, the ethnic Croat Bosnia-Herzegovina foreign minister, by Senad Mesetovic; place and date not given]

[9 Mar p 5]

[FBIS Translated Text]

One Diplomat—100,000 German Marks

We have been talking to Jadranko Prlic, the new foreign minister at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, about the current changes at the ministry and some other issues.

[Mesetovic] What did you find at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when you took office?

[Prlic] What I found at the ministry is an internal matter. I continued with the work from the positions at that time and my achievements will be assessed by the people.

[Mesetovic] What is your opinion about your predecessors, Silajdzic, Ljubijankic, and Sacirbegovic?

[Prlic] Very good.

[Mesetovic] Do you have the model of what an ambassador of Bosnia-Herzegovina should look like?

[Prlic] He should look European. He should behave in the way in which diplomats are normally recognized, he should be an absolute professional, he should have a perfect command of the necessary language, and, naturally, he should be faithful to the interests of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a state organized in accordance with the valid regulations.

[Mesetovic] Do you think that your ministry should organize a training school for prospective diplomats?

[Prlic] We have already made certain agreements with some countries about sending some people for education there. We do not have the conditions for educating them here, since we do not have the teaching personnel, and this ministry does not want to improvise; it does not make sense to set up a school without teachers.

It Is Not Easy To Earn 100,000 German Marks [DM]

[Prlic continues] We shall be announcing an open competition for all those who want to work in diplomacy, but they will have to fulfill very difficult criteria. One of these will involve taking an examination before a competent commission in a foreign language. This will be the first test to pass before being even considered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Mesetovic] Will more work be done on expanding the present diplomatic network?

[Prlic] We will increase the number of our diplomatic and consular offices according to the dictates of foreign policy, but we will be trying to reduce the number of employees.

[Mesetovic] In other words, smaller but more efficient teams at embassies? [Prlic] Yes, with professionals. There are embassies with two or three people. According to the scheme that we are about to complete and which should be approved by the government next week, the majority of embassies will consist of two or three people.

[Mesetovic] In what parts of the world will we be reducing or increasing the number of our diplomatic and consular offices?

[Prlic] We will be increasing their number in Europe; we are going to open new embassies in some European countries. We will be opening new ones in South America, we will probably cover Asia with one or two embassies, and in Canada. This is what we have planned, roughly speaking.

[Mesetovic] Does this mean that we are going into countries and areas in which Bosnia-Herzegovina has economic interests?

[Prlic] Every embassy will be opened on the basis of a feasibility study. You must know one thing: Every employee at a diplomatic or consular office costs the state approximately DM100,000 per year. It is not easy to earn DM100,000 and we have to introduce clear microeconomic criteria into our work.

Everybody Is Right

[Mesetovic] What will be the ethnic structure of the diplomatic corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Prlic] It will be like the structure of the state administration, which has to correspond to valid constitutional and legal regulations. We must enable all the constituent nations [ethnic groups] of Bosnia-Herzegovina to participate in our ministry and diplomatic corps if we wish to represent Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is intolerable—I know that that system was transferred with inertia from past times and is a result of the disorderly internal political system of Bosnia-Herzegovina—to have a significant number of diplomatic and consular offices that are absolutely one-national.

[Mesetovic] What do you think about "the Hadzici case"?

[Prlic] Every piece of information in Bosnia-Herzegovina is influenced by either one side or

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another. This is our objective situation, we have difficulties in mastering it, and I do not not have much faith in those who think that it is easy to solve with a universal formula. Especially the problem of the police. There are still no Federation police. We have not implemented the law on internal affairs yet. The problem is that we effectively do not have the Federation. I wish the new Federation Government much success. The Republic Government has left them enough space and we will not work in areas that the Federation Government should, but it is necessary to build up the state and the Federation is effectively the state.

[Mesetovic] Why don't the Herzeg-Bosnia police and the Ministry of Internal Affairs [of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina] merge?

[Prlic] They could not merge since we do not have cantons. There is no uniformed police at the Federation level as prescribed in the Constitution of the Federation and the Law on Internal Affairs. The "Hadzici issue" and other problems are things that could have been overcome, however. One police force should be made out of two, which will be cantonal and will enter the Federation system. In the present situation, everyone and no one is right.

[Box, p 5]

Secret

[Mesetovic] Are you happy with the present work of our diplomatic and consular offices?

[Prlic] With some, yes, but I am absolutely not pleased with the work of others.

[Mesetovic] Is it a secret which you are pleased with and which you are not?

[Prlic] Yes, it is.

[Box, p 5]

Crossword Puzzles With Personnel

[Mesetovic] Many people claim that you are an excellent economist and that this should be your field of work, not diplomacy.

[Prlic] I found myself in this position as a result of circumstances and "crossword puzzles with personnel." I have never had any ambition to become a diplomat, but I will carry out my duty professionally; I will learn what I do not know and what I have not learned up to now, but I think that the economy is our only prospect anyway. You can see that we have completely adapted ourselves to the new circumstances over the last month.

[10 Mar p 5]

[FBIS Translated Text]

The Word of the Minister Is the Reputation of the Country

[Mesetovic] How are your relations with the Herzegovina lobby?

[Prlic] The Herzegovina lobby does not exist. If it did exist, it would not be such a bad thing. I come from Herzegovina and have lived there all my life, but I cannot see that such a lobby exists. Certain things are mentioned in a lazy way; there are very good and capable people in Herzegovina, but there are also many who are not very valuable. I think that the tragedy of my people and those from Herzegovina is that people who do not deserve it have become stereotypes, that is, types that the Herzegovina population is recognized as. I include both nations in this.

[Mesetovic] Will you be on the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] election lists at the next election?

[Prlic] I do not know. I have no ambitions. We shall see; it is difficult to say now.

[Mesetovic] You are a Republic minister, so do you represent the Serbs, too?

[Prlic] I represent all the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. When I speak, and I delivered a speech at the Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, I spoke on behalf of all citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I do not want to put myself—in view of the definition of my post—into a position to be saying what I think as a Croat about this issue, since things are quite clear.

Taking a Risk

[Prlic continues] Whatever I say is the official policy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Every word from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is exclusively viewed in that light. Every word that I utter is the official policy of the state and, if I say something, this is the reputation of the state. I only behave according to this principle. Nothing more. I am a Croat; this is indisputable. For other nations I am too good, but for the Croats not too good, but that is how it is. [sentence as published]

[Mesetovic] Will diplomats be selected according to their merits in their parties?

[Prlic] To some extent yes, but for the most part no.

[Mesetovic] To what extent yes and to what extent no?

[Prlic] You have to respect the election results. Elections do impose certain things. We will be predominantly

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appointing professionals to the positions of ministerial aides, but a professional can be a party member, too. If someone is a party member, it does not automatically mean that he is not a professional. There is the public view that anyone from the HDZ or the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] is not competent. This is not true.

[Mesetovic] Can you comment on the accusations from the Posavina corridor population that you sold them out.

[Prlic] In what respect?

[Mesetovic] After Dayton.

[Prlic] Someone had to take that risk. I have taken risks several times during this war. I am aware of my personal attitudes, of different attitudes, and other things, but someone has to do such things, too. I did not sign the Dayton agreement; I only cosigned it, but in that way I paved the way for peace.

Steps Forward

[Prlic continues] I am the least of all to blame and I am the least responsible in the positive sense of the word. There are certain points in history and certain points in life, when you in effect take certain responsibilities, even for things for which you are not responsible. It is simply like that. I am aware of all the consequences.

[Mesetovic] Do you think today that this issue could have been solved in Dayton in some other way, even at the cost of drawing out the negotiations?

[Prlic] Not at Dayton! "The lines of magnetic force that had to define that problem had clashed already" [as published] and no matter how long we stayed there, no better solution could have been reached.

[Mesetovic] Do you know who ordered the destruction of the old bridge in Mostar?

[Prlic] No!

[Mesetovic] What is necessary for Mostar to start functioning as a unit and is it possible?

[Prlic] It will live as a unit; there is no doubt at all about that. What is important is the modality of how it should function. It is the same with Bosnia-Herzegovina. All Croats are simply being accused of opposing Bosnia-Herzegovina. Everything depends on the cantonal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however. Is there any Bosniak in Bosnia-Herzegovina today who does not accept the cantonal structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Let us discuss things that represent the internal organization of the state.

You have the same situation in Mostar, too. Mostar is a consequence of the agreement on six districts; there were problems over drawing up borders between them. It will function, just as it is functioning now without these districts. Certain things need time to be implemented. Look at the present situation. Some things were completely unrealistic six months ago, but they are a reality now. Three months ago, it was completely unrealistic to imagine travelling from Sarajevo to Mostar on the main road. You can take this road more or less without any problems today and in 15 days you will be able to take it without any problems whatsoever. These are significant steps forward. This will happen in Mostar, too.

[Box, p 5]

Too Expensive in a Hotel

[Mesetovic] What foreign languages do you speak?

[Prlic] Only English.

[Mesetovic] Actively?

[Prlic] I could be better.

[Mesetovic] Where do you live in Sarajevo?

[Prlic] At the Holiday Inn, unfortunately.

[Mesetovic] Are you not happy with the accommodation there?

[Prlic] I am, but I do not think that anybody can be pleased about living in a hotel. First of all, it is too expensive an arrangement and, apart from that, it is not convenient.

[Mesetovic] Where is you family?

[Prlic] My family is now in Zagreb.

[Mesetovic] This means that you are single here.

[Prlic] I have been single throughout the war.

B-H: Zubak, Ganic Comment on Croat-Bosniak Cooperation

AU2003073796 Vienna Oesterreich Eins Radio Network in German 1700 GMT 19 Mar 96

[Report by Konstanze Ripar on talks on "the new Bosnia" at the U.S. Embassy in Vienna on 19 March—statement by Kresimir Zubak, president of the Bosnia-Herzogovina Federation, in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed German translation; statements by Ejup Ganic, vice president of the Federation, and U.S. negotiator John Server in English with superimposed German translation—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Both Croats and Bosniaks admit that there are great tensions between them in the Federation. Yesterday, the two sides committed themselves again in a new 12-point document to cooperate better.

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Kresimir Zubak, Croat president of the Federation:

[Zubak] For the first time there are sanctions against those who want to obstruct the cohesion of the Federation and its development. We will exchange [word as heard] such people at all levels, and cantons that do not implement federal objectives will not get any more money.

Ejup Ganic, Muslim vice president of the Federation, puts part of the blame for the current problems in cooperation on the international community.

[Ganic] The international community sent us UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] when the war was still going on, and people were dying all the time. These forces could not help or protect us or end the killing. When peace was established, they sent us armed forces that had the mandate for any kind of intervention. When we needed a doctor, they sent us a priest; when we needed a priest, they sent us a doctor.

[Ripar] U.S. negotiator John Server said that it was an advantage that at least now there should be regular talks. This was agreed in yesterday's document. After all, nobody could work wonders, as he said. Cooperation was developing slowly but surely.

[Server] My objective is not really to make people like each other, but it is to give them the free choice to like each other or not. And that requires strong institutions, a strong society that allows free choices.

[Ripar] Two years of the Federation—there are small signs of progress.

B-H: Zubak Interviewed on Federation Progress

AU2003130496 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 17 Mar 96 p 5

[Interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Jozo Pavkovic; place and date not given: "Croats Want Federation, Bosniaks Want Republic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A series of incidents around Sarajevo has once again drawn attention to the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton agreement regarding the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That was the reason for our interview with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Pavkovic] The two constituent nations have different views of the political establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Is that also the essential problem in the construction of Croat-Bosniak relations?

[Zubak] On many occasions recently I have presented my own opinion regarding Croat-Bosniak relations, having pointed out that the problems, which have been appearing for a long time now, were the consequence of an unbalanced approach to the Federation project. While the Croats think that the Federation is a community of two nations, organized in cantons, the Bosniak side thinks it is a means to get to another objective—a civic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Bosniaks see the Federation as an area divided into regions, instead of which term they use term cantons. So, they have not essentially changed their political concept of the establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hence all the problems, which as a rule escalate at the moment when something defined by the Constitution and laws is to be carried out. There is no sphere of life or work where we totally agree. Since the Bosniaks have not yet redefined their political concept, it will be difficult to solve the accumulated problems.

[Pavkovic] The Bosniaks have created their status of a victim mostly in the besieged Sarajevo, which has been unblocked by the implementation of the Dayton agreement. The others are now becoming victims, are they not?

[Zubak] The Bosniaks are the victim. However, speaking of Sarajevo, in the recent events and measures which they have taken, they have shown that only orally and in declarations do they want a multiethnic, multicultural community. They have done little or almost nothing in order to maintain that multiethnicity. We know what has happened to the Serbs, but if the Bosniaks were really so interested in arranging that area the way they publicly advocate, then they would have a different attitude, at least in the relations with the Croats. They would have accepted what the Croats had been supporting, at least when the organization of the territory of the city of Sarajevo is in question.

[Pavkovic] Before Sarajevo, Mostar was considered to be the biggest problem. It has been pretentiously emphasized that it was the bedrock of the Federation. Is the question of Mostar solved, or is it momentarily only in the shadow of the events in the outskirts of Sarajevo?

[Zubak] On the question of Mostar, the Croats have let the general public know that nothing was disputable if the decisions were just and legal. After Koschnick's illegal decision, we have found the solution in Rome. We are working on the implementation of the agreement now, and the situation has become normal.

[Pavkovic] A great obstacle for the Federation is the fact that one still does not know what the jurisdiction of the Republic is, and what of the Federation. When

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will the Federation break free from the firm hug of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zubak] The Dayton agreement on the implementation of the Federation has defined authorities which will remain in the competence of the transitional institutions of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, only short remarks have been given in that agreement. Now, the Bosniak and the Croat side have different interpretations of the agreements. The Croats favor the Federation, and the Bosniaks favor the Republic. We have not defined what is whose responsibility.

[Pavkovic] All this is additionally complicated by the establishment of quasi-state institutions within the Federation. Can you explain to us what is the purpose of the Agency for Investigation and Documentation?

[Zubak] I can only guess, because I have no hard evidence. It is a fact that it is a quasi-state organization, organized against the provision of the Constitution of the Federation and against the provisions of the laws on republican ministries.

[Pavkovic] How is the process of transfer of authorities from the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia to the Federation going?

[Zubak] We will be gradually depriving Herzeg-Bosnia of the competencies of a state organization and transferring them to the Federation as the institutions of Federation authority develop. It is well known that in those institutions we have very good mechanisms of protecting the vital national interests. Herzeg-Bosnia will remain in the following period as one of the forms of political, economic, cultural, and any other association of the Croat nation. It will be authorized to promote political and other objectives of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and it will be organized in a way that those objectives will be realized through the institutions of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Pavkovic] When they lose Herzeg-Bosnia, will the Croats be granted equality through the new cantonal organization?

[Zubak] If we remember the difficult situation in which we found ourselves at the time of signing the Vienna treaty, from the present point of view I can say that we can be satisfied. However, we will see only in practice whether the cantonal organization would need any adjustment, whether the cantons will grow. Certainly, everything will depend upon the totality of political relations between the partners in the Federation. I appraise that it will take three, four years until the political circumstances stabilize. Only then will we be able to estimate our political position.

[Pavkovic] Are there enough Croat employees in Sarajevo, particularly in the institutions of the Federation authorities?

[Zubak] No! That is a big problem. If we had more personnel, our position would be better. In Dayton, we pointed out that all the ministries will be reconstituted. So, the actual personnel will not be taken over automatically, but selectively. Thus, an appropriate representation of Croats in all organs will be provided.

[Pavkovic] What does your cooperation with the Bosniak politicians look like?

[Zubak] My contacts with Mr. Ganic are correct, even when our opinions diverge. The essential problem is our different political concept, which often affects our mutual relations.

[Pavkovic] One more moot point in the establishment of the Federation is the return of refugees. How is this process going on?

[Zubak] The process has been conducted on two sides. Two political partners, assisted by the mediation of the international community, are looking for the solution for four towns—Jajce, Bugojno, Stolac, and Travnik—for which they have promised in Dayton those towns would be "guinea pigs." The UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] takes care about the complete return of all the displaced and refugees. The institutions of the Federation authorities have been working to solve that problem. The program is being processed and it has been agreed on to a large degree. Through this plan the UNHCR has clearly defined that the ethnic structure of the population cannot be changed in the area of central Bosnia and in the Neretva River valley—two mixed cantons—as we, after all, have signed in Petersburg.

[Pavkovic] Croatian Prime Minister Matesa and his associates officially visited Sarajevo this week. Have the talks been successful?

[Zubak] Messrs. Matesa, Granic, and Prlic have informed me that the talks had been "hard" at some stages, but everything resulted in a successful agreement.

[Pavkovic] Does the world accept the Federation as a serious factor with which to discuss disputed issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Zubak] The Federation is a subject they respect. The world is concerned about the situation here, particularly because the Croat-Bosniak relations have not been solved. Admiral Smith told me a couple of days ago that they were not here to arrange relations within the Federation, but to prevent the conflict between us and the Serb Republic. According to the situation on the

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ground, IFOR [Implementation Force] must intervene more frequently and extinguish fires precisely in the territory where the Croats and Bosniaks live.

[Pavkovic] How far has the organization of the federal army gone?

[Zubak] We are still talking. We have agreed a lot regarding the Defense Law. We have two huge disputed questions. First, the primary command. According to the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the Federation are under command of the president and vice president of the Federation. The Bosniaks want it the other way, in order to keep a certain position to Izetbegovic, but we cannot accept any unconstitutional solutions.

[Pavkovic] One gets the impression that the Sarajevo media have been conducting a fierce war against everything which is not on the "green line," particularly against you. Why?

[Zubak] To make war against the media means to lose the war in advance, because you have no opportunity to express your opinion. That is obvious with the Sarajevo media. Even those who call themselves independent work in line with the policy against the Croats. The media war against anything Croatian has been conducted continually. When I give a statement, it is obligatorily reduced, and they quote from my context everything unimportant and superficial. The best example of that is my appearance at the Bosniak intellectual "pool," where I gave a two-hour speech. They published none of it. However, they have served up one sentence, of course, torn out of context, according to which it fell out that there will be a war between the Croats and the Bosniaks. Of course, they were not interested in my saying that if there is no readiness among the Croats and Bosniaks, that if we are then making a futile thing, then it could happen just like a New York magazine had written, that it was not impossible that those disagreements could turn into a war. And now, because of a topsy-turvy quotation, they want to present me as a man who advocates war.

[Box, p 5]

Sarajevo Unmasks Bosniak Objectives

[Pavkovic] The cantonal organization of Sarajevo has caused exasperation among the Croats. Will there be any change of the decision made by the extreme part of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action]?

[Zubak] With the example of Sarajevo the real objectives of the Bosniak leadership have been unmasked. They have made decisions on the rearrangement of that area, although we had made an agreement to organize that area as a canton of which the internal organization will be arranged on the basis of a special political agreement. The Constitution of the Federation defines the region of Sarajevo as a district. One cannot constitute a canton or any other form of political or legal organization of that area until the provision which defines it that way is changed. They have seriously violated the Constitution and the political agreement on Sarajevo.

[Pavkovic] There are big problems regarding the establishment of the police forces in the Sarajevo suburbs. The Bosniaks claim that the federal policemen have arrived there. You, on the other hand, think that is not so?

[Zubak] The international factors have also been tricked by the mention of the federal police. But, that police force has not been organized in the way envisaged by the Rome agreement. Therefore, I wanted the Federation to disassociate itself from everything that happens there, particularly in Ilidza, where there have been great pressures on the Serbs and not numerous Croats. There has been a lot of crime. The international community is not satisfied with the security situation in that area, either. Since the representatives of the Croat policemen have not participated in it as we have agreed, then I, as the president of the Federation, have publicly said that the Federation cannot take responsibility for such a situation.

[Box, p 5]

Talks With the Serbs

[Pavkovic] Recently contacts have been established with the Serb entity in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Zubak] We have more frequent contacts with the Serb Republic now—to be sure, not at the highest level. The talks are necessary. I hope that the contacts will intensify even more. The representatives of the international community, who are here to carry out the civilian part of the Dayton agreement, also make us do that.

[Pavkovic] At what stage is the drawing of the multiethnic line between the Federation and the Serb Republic?

[Zubak] The committees have been formed and we have been negotiating intensively, assisted by the mediation of the international community. By 19 March we should have that question arranged. All three sides have given their proposals about what they wanted to change regarding the line determined in Dayton. To my knowledge, nothing has changed essentially. There have only been some agreements, particularly regarding the area to the south of Brcko, which is under control of the HVO [Croatian Defense Council]. It has been agreed in principle that there will be no final agreement until all the stands are coordinated.

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B-H: Ex-PM Silajdzic: Disintegration of Bosnia in Progress

LD1903172796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1348 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Paris, March 19 (TANJUG)—Former Bosnian Muslim Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic has told a French radio that the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina is in progress.

Silajdzic, former principal advisor of Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic, said that the division on the ethnic principle was being introduced and called on the international community to urgently stop the 'suicidal disintegration process.'

Silajdzic's interview was full of accusations against Western governments and press.

He accused the West of 'having other priorities' than to preserve the integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 'No one speaks about the respect for Bosnia's internationally recognized borders,' Silajdzic said.

He criticized Izetbegovic by saying that the Bosnian Muslim delegation should not have gone to the recent tripartite meeting in Rome.

'The leaving for Rome is our mistake. Our delegation should never have conferred with Croats about the division of Mostar. The Dayton Agreement was undermined by the Rome agreement,' Silajdzic said.

He said that Western press took part in the 'conspiracy of silence,' especially about the secessionist behaviour of Croats, while giving extensive coverage to 'marginal issues' such as Mujaheddin.

Silajdzic said that 'rewards were granted to those (Croats) who set up concentration camps around Mostar and destroyed every mark of multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina.'

B-H: Bugojno Refugees Unable To Return Despite Accord

AU1903163096 Paris AFP in English 1445 GMT 19 Mar 96

[By Kevin McElderry]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bugojno, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 19 (AFP)—Former enemy Croats and Moslems are still unable to return to their homes, despite the latest international accords, officials and refugees said in this central Bosnian town Tuesday [19 March].

Croats kicked out of Bugojno in 1993 are welcome to return, the Moslem mayor of Bugojno told AFP. But there was "no room for them and no money to repair their homes," he added.

At a meeting in Geneva Monday, Bosnian and Croatian leaders agreed to unify the divided city of Mostar, ensure freedom of movement, and guarantee the return of refugees to their original homes.

The former allies vowed to sack local mayors blocking the implementation of the Dayton accords, and agreed reconstruction aid would be granted only to local districts fully complying with agreement.

But in Bugojno, a Croat woman who did not want to be named for fear of reprisals said some Croat families who tried to return had to give up because of harrassment from municipal authorities and police.

The woman, who said she has lived in Bugojno for 30 years, said many Croat homes had been destroyed and the Moslems who had in 1993 taken over those that were habitable refused now to move out.

A local Catholic priest, Brother Janko Ljubas, said that during the 1993-1994 Moslem-Croat war "at least we had hope and the power to surive because we thought things would change. But now we have no hope."

He said Croats who wanted to return were hassled at Moslem checkpoints and warned to stayed only days. After that, "the police come to the house and escort them out. They are forced to leave."

In an interview with AFP, Bugojno Mayor Dzevad Mlaco denied claims that the Moslem authorities were making it impossible for Croats to return.

Money was needed to repair homes that were uninhabitable. And Moslem refugees living in the homes of other Croat families had to have somewhere else to go before the original Croat owners could come back, he said.

Bugojno had some 18,000 Moslems, 17,000 Croats and about 10,000 Serbs before the war.

Now there are around 1,500 Croats, just a handful of Serbs but the Moslem population has been swelled by more than 10,000 refugees from other towns, municipal officials said.

Mlaco showed AFP a list of 217 Creoat families who he said could return as soon as they wanted. Of those, 95 had come back, he said.

"A Croat family must say seven days in advance they are coming so that we can find housing for the people who are living in their homes now."

He also gave AFP a list of 104 ruined Croat houses in Bugojno, saying it would cost more than one million German marks (680,000 dollars) to make them fit for living in again.

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Revealing the horse-trading in humanity that marks the Bosnian war, he provided a list of 135 Moslem families from the nearby town of Jajce who were living in Croat houses in Bugojno.

Once they were allowed to return to Jajce, the Croats from Bugojno could get their houses back, he said.

"We are for returning everyone back to their homes but we cannot throw people onto the streets," he said.

A western aid agency official, speaking under cover of anonymity, said he could confirm the Croat woman's assessment of the situation.

At best, the Moslem authorities had been "cautious" in letting Croats back, he said.

B-H: Bugojno Croats Appeal to Bildt for Protection

LD1903223996 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The pressure by Bosniak extremists in Bugojno does not cease. This is why the Croats from Bugojno appealed to Carl Bildt, asking for protection by the international forces for the implementation of the civilian part of the Dayton Agreement. Zeljka Mihaljevic reports:

[Mihaljevic] The destruction of Croat property, intimidation, and humiliation of a small number of Croats who have stayed in Bugojno do not cease even now, after all agreements. The Washington, Dayton, and Rome agreements have brought increased dangers for the legal security of Croats in Bugojno, as well as the security of their property.

Almost every week a Croat house is set on fire, or the roof and furnishings of a house are stripped. Robberies and threats to Croat people are an everyday occurrence, said the open letter sent by the Bugojno municipal council with temporary headquarters in Livno to Carl Bildt, high representative of the international community for the implementation of the civilian part of the peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

B-H: Croats, Bosniaks Maintain Police Barricades in Mostar

AU1903165296 Paris AFP in English 1502 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 19 (AFP)—Croats and Moslems in Mostar maintained Tuesday [19 March] their police barricades in defiance of decisions reached in Geneva to unify the southern city.

At the exit from the eastern, or Moslem, half of the town, Croat police kept their roadblock and continued to monitor vehicles on this strategic route linking the Bosnian capital Sarajevo to the sea.

In the eastern sector, Moslem police were manning a checkpoint leading to the bridge over the Neretva river that joins the two sides of Mostar.

On Monday, however, NATO forces had told authorities that the checkpoints were illegal within what is supposed to be a unified Moslem-Croat federation, that makes up with the Serb republic the two entities in Bosnia.

In Geneva Monday, the former Moslem and Croat enemies had re-stated their commitment to restore freedom of movement in Mostar and their support for the European Union administrator for the city.

Mostar, Bosnia's second largest city after Sarajevo, has been run since July 1994 by the EU, which is trying to unify the town. Since Moslem-Croat fighting in 1993-94, Mostar has been divided between the two sides.

The city is considered a key test to see if the federation can work.

In Geneva, the former warring factions agreed the Moslem-Croat federation must work if peace is to prevail.

But the reality on the ground in Mostar Tuesday was in direct contradiction with the conclusions in Geneva, which in fact only were a reinforcement of the Dayton peace accord that last December ended Bosnia's nearly four-year-long war.

In theory, there is freedom of movement in Mostar but this is not the case in fact. The two sides keep to their own sectors and are scared of each other's police.

Creating a unified police force is designed to eliminate this fear and has been a prime EU goal. But joint patrols were suspended Monday and a European police officer in Mostar said: "They do not want a unified police and they will do everything they can to gain time until we leave."

The lack of substance to the federation will be highlighted again Wednesday when territories are swapped near Mostar among the factions to carry out the Dayton accord. A meeting has been fixed between Bosnian Serbs and Moslems and another between Serbs and Croats, as the two sides in Mostar prefer to deal separately with the Serbs rather than as a united front.

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B-H: Federation Completes Takeover in Podvelezje Region

AU1903214296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[Report by Mirsad Behran from Mostar]

[FBIS Translated Text] Early this morning, police officers of the Mostar police station, organized into several groups, took over control of the Podvelezje plateau east of Mostar, and the area was included into the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. The Mostar police station confirmed that the takevoer by the federal authorities in areas formerly under Serb control passed without any incidents.

Our crew found the Podvelezje area deserted. Namely, before the aggression on the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the area was almost 100 percent Bosniak. In the summer of 1992, the Serb-Montenegrin aggressor captured the area and expelled Bosniaks from their homes. In addition to houses, religious buildings, schools, the infrastructure, medical facilities, and other installations were also torched.

The reintegration of the Podvelezje region into the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina also included the Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio Television relay—situated on Mt. Velez—into the territory under control of the legitimate Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities. It was impossible to reach the relay due to snow blocking the roads, but we know for certain that the aggressor completely destroyed the Bosnia-Herzegovina Radio Television relay.

B-H: Government Takes Control of Mountains Overlooking Mostar

AU2003122396 Paris AFP in English 1139 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina, March 20 (AFP)—The transfer of control from Serbs to Muslims of mountainous areas overlooking this divided Hercegovina city went ahead without any problems Wednesday, western military officials said here.

"The zone is very quiet," the officials said.

Mostar was one of the four areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina which saw a formal transfer of authority at just after midnight Tuesday. The others were the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, the eastern enclave of Gorazde and an area in central Bosnia known as "the anvil."

The Serbs had held onto the mountains overlooking the city of Mostar throughout the Bosnian war. Mostar was divided in 1993 between Moslems and Croats who fought a bitter 11-month war up to February 1994.

B-H: NATO: Army Withdrawing Heavy Arms From Sarajevo

AU1903164096 Paris AFP in English 1450 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, March 19 (AFP)—Bosnian army troops have begun withdrawing heavy arms from Sarajevo ahead of a Tuesday [19 March] midnight deadline for the demilitarisation of the city, a NATO official said.

"They brought some heavy weapons out of Marshall Tito barracks last night (Monday)," the official said on condition of anonymity.

Another officer with the NATO-led peace Implementation Force (IFOR) said the weapons evacuation was continuing Tuesday.

These were the first indications that the Bosnian army was preparing to pull out of Sarajevo in line with the Dayton peace accords.

The central Tito barracks house more than 50 armoured vehicles and artillery pieces.

Most of Sarajevo falls within the four-kilometre (two-mile) band of demilitarised territory that is being established between the two entities, the Moslem-Croat federation and the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska, into which Bosnia-Hercegovina is being petitioned under the U.S.-brokered Dayton peace plan.

All light and heavy weapons and uniformed personnel are to be withdrawn from the 1,000-kilometre (600-mile) separation zone by midnight March 19.

IFOR believes around 4,500 Bosnian troops remain within the zone, most of them in Sarajevo.

Bosnian compliance "remains to be seen," IFOR spokesman Simon Haselock said. "We will reserve our judgement until this afternoon," he added, referring to a pledge by the Bosnian chief of general staff General Rasim Delic who on Monday agreed to produce a complete withdrawal plan by Tuesday afternoon.

"We'd like to keep our powder dry until we see the plan."

B-H: Removal of Antisniper Protection Begins in Sarajevo

AU1903205996 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The removal of antisniper protection will begin in Sarajevo this evening. In the next 20 days all types of protection equipment, including

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sandbags, blocks, and containers, will have to be removed, Sefke Okeric, president of the Sarajevo City Executive Council, told the press today. The city Executive Council has earmarked 80,000 German marks for the operation, but the funds will be used to remove only the protective equipment installed by the city.

B-H: Bosnian Army Withdraws From Central Sarajevo

AU2003120696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Several hundred members of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina have left Sarajevo in compliance with the agreement on the Sarajevo demilitarized zone, Tom Moyer, spokesman for IFOR [Implementation Force] in Sarajevo, said today. The units and weapons that belong to the Bosnian Army have been withdrawn from the Marshal Tito Barracks, he said.

In compliance with the Dayton agreement, the capital city of Bosnia-Herzegovina entered the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at midnight and became a united city. The process of Sarajevo's reintegration, through which the jurisdiction of the Federation was extended to the five Sarajevo suburbs that were under the control of the Serb entity, has thereby officially concluded.

B-H: OSCE To 'Regulate' Media If Parties Cannot Agree

AU1903161396 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 96 p 5

[ONASA report: "Media Under International 'Protectorate'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 15 Mar—It was concluded at the meeting of the joint civilian committee of both entities at the ministerial level that the working group for the media had not yielded satisfactory results. It was decided that, if both sides fail to reach an agreement on the basic functioning of the media before the elections, OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] representatives would take over and regulate media behavior.

It was also decided at the meeting that the language used in the media had to be improved, while Michael Steiner, deputy to the international community's high representative for the implementation of the civilian part of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace agreement, addressed the possibility of public television stations.

Moreover, it was agreed at the meeting that democratic forces should be given access to TV stations and that the work of Sarajevo Studio 99 should be expanded.

B-H: Sarajevo Serb Official: Muslims Manipulating Refugees

LD1903231296 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1834 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 March (SRNA)—With regard to an organized attempt by a group of Muslims to enter Serb parts of Dobrinja, Ilidza Mayor Nedeljko Prstojevic said today that such irresponsible acts could lead to incidents, detrimental to both sides.

"The Muslim leadership of the Novi Grad municipality is persistently manipulating the so-called returnees to parts of Dobrinja One and Dobrinja Four, which is in contravention of the Dayton agreement and Carl Bildt's statements," Prstojevic told SRNA.

He explained that there was a precisely defined procedure for the return of refugees and that organized attempts by Muslims to enter Serb parts of Dobrinja, as it happened today, "represent risky actions that can lead to incidents."

"Such dangerous actions are not going to be overlooked by the Ilidza Serbs who are determined to stay in their new homes, in compliance with the Dayton agreement and Bildt's statement," Prstojevic concluded.

Dobrinja One and Dobrinja Four have been inhabited by the Serbs who were evacuated from Serb Sarajevo, predominantly from parts of the Serb municipality of Ilidza which were handed over to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Territorial settlement has not yet been carried out in these two suburbs in which around 100 Muslims tried to enter today. The settlement is to be resolved at the level of state commissions for territorial settlement.

B-H: SDA Plans Tuzla-Podrinje Canton Interparty Elections

AU2003073596 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 96 p 4

[Report by ONASA: "Voting and Return"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tuzla, 15 Mar—The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] believes that refugees should vote for candidate lists from their municipalities, since this is a condition for their return home, the SDA Main Committee told a news conference in Tuzla yesterday.

"Certain problems exist in the Tuzla-Podrinje Canton, in the Brcko, Gracanica, and Kladanj municipalites, and that is why we have organized interparty elections, which will be over before the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The essence of these problems is in personnel, because as a rule, the disagreements are

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between the municipal governors and chairmen of the SDA municipal councils," Tarik Arapcic, vice president of the Tuzla SDA Cantonal Council, said.

B-H: SDA Questions Belgrade 'Sincerity' To Normalize Ties

AU1903194896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA] of Sandzak has announced that it supports the normalization of relations between Bosnia-Herzegovina and FRY, but yet it remains skeptical about the sincerity of Belgrade's intentions to fully normalize relations. The fact that President Milosevic predominantly refers to entities in public, thus giving them properties of states, and quite infrequently refers to Bosnia as an internationally recognized state is a reason for concern, says the Sandzak SDA.

B-H: Karadzic Discusses Serb Exodus, War Crimes

AU1903171196 Belgrade INTERVJU in Serbo-Croatian 18 Mar 96 pp 8-11

[Interview with Serb Republic President Radovan Karadzic by Snezana Rakocevic-Kovacevic in Pale; date not given: "They Are Coming To Take Me Away!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] I try in vain to make a contact from one of the few telephones that are functioning in the Sarajevo district (and soon no longer Serbian) of Grbavica with the president of the Serb Republic, Radovan Karadzic. He has been absent the whole day, which immediately refutes the rumors circulating in Belgrade that his movements have been largely limited, that he is actually no longer in power, and that he is functioning as president only until the new elections (or until the first close encounter with the Implementation Force [IFOR]) take place.

I make a decision—I will go there without previously making an appointment, so help me God. Biljana, his secretary, kindly informs me that the president will be available for an interview only at the end of office hours, around 1900. In the late afternoon we are on our way to Pale along Trebevic road. My heart breaks as we pass a column of trucks loaded with belongings of people leaving Serb Sarajevo. About 400 trucks (which is approximately the number heading to Pale on a daily basis), which we manage to count as we drive past, are carrying entire lives. Stylish furniture, chickens, windows, doors, goats, sheep, dismantled bathtubs and toilet bowls, and people—all of them thrown together in the same bag of despair and taken by shipping firms from all over Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic (which costs a fortune, for one man's loss is another man's gain) mostly into the unknown.

"Roads will miss Serbs, but there will be no Serb left [as published]," a man shouts as we pass the kilometers-long column, fearing delay.

"Nobody's position, either mine or yours, can be more important than the stability of our country," Karadzic is shouting into the phone receiver as I enter his office, escorted by secretary Biljana. He nods as a sign of welcome, and points to a chair for me to sit down, continuing his phone conversation. Judging by the words he is using, he is explaining to some municipal official that he is supposed to resign and thereby contribute to the strengthening of confidence in the authorities and state bodies.

Karadzic Is Not Afraid of The Hague but...

I apologize to the president for my being late, visibly moved by the image of the big column of Sarajevo Serbs, so our conversation starts spontaneously, although we have not agreed on what topics to discuss.

"People have decided to go," Karadzic explains, "and that is a difficult decision, but the freedom the Serbs have experienced in the Serb Republic is the most precious thing to them. It is more precious than their homes or their centuries-long roots...."

As I switch on my tape recorder the president warns me that he has frozen relations with the media for a certain time, at least as far as long interviews are concerned. He is always available for small talk and statements regarding some ongoing activities, though. As he says, he needs time to put certain things in their places, collect impressions, make assessments.... The charges against him brought in The Hague have put him in a very difficult position. As he says, he is not afraid of them, but demands that in the new conditions things be placed where they belong. After all, he is always more obliged toward certain newspapers and journalists than toward others.

Still, the columns of Serbs heading toward Pale do not allow for silence.

[Karadzic] From the arrival of the Turks until today we have not had our own state west of the Drina. Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the first and the second Yugoslavia, were not our states. In them we had to do many things covertly, to watch what we said or how we lived. During the three and a half years of war we secured the greatest degree of freedom ever. This can be seen from the fact that we have not had any political trials, and everybody has been able to say what he or she really thinks. The leadership has not responded

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even to slanders.... The people simply felt that survival is possible only in a Serb state, so they decided to abandon the Muslim-Croatian Federation. Even those who decided in the beginning to stay in it are leaving. Before the exodus of the Sarajevo Serbs, the exodus of almost 17,000 Serbs from Odzak and Vukosavlje passed unnoticed in the public. We did everything to arrange for them to stay in Vukosavlje and work in the Serb Republic, but they decided to go to Brcko and its neighboring municipalities.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] The exodus of Sarajevo's Serbs is just one of many Serb exoduses during this war, but it is fatal for them. The Sarajevo Serbs are the most urban, educated, and largest army of Serbs, who will find it difficult to find an adequate urban environment in which to live. All the more since now they are moving out, while until recently they were being reassured that Serb Sarajevo would remain Serb!

[Karadzic] Sarajevo is a Serb city, and it has always been Serb. It was founded on Serb land. For many centuries the Serbs made up an ethnic majority there. Only with the last (communist) policy of Muslim nationalism encouraged by Hamdija Pozderac was the ethnic structure of Sarajevo disturbed, much less through a high birth rate—because the Sarajevo Muslims were civilized, after all, and their lifestyles were similar to those of Serbs—and much more through considerable immigration of people from Zepa, Rogatica, and particularly from Sandzak, whose almost entire populations moved to Sarajevo. Then the Bosnian Muslim authorities (the Serbs who were in power were their proteges) began to build Muslim settlements like, for instance, Sokolovic Kolonija, Sokolj, or Hrasno in the middle of Serb territory such as Ilidza, for instance. These settlements were illegally built there. The authorities turned a blind eye to Muslim immigrants who built houses there and only thereafter got building permits. In such a way the Serb ethnic space around Sarajevo was diminished. Despite that, we managed to keep a part of Sarajevo and set up some borders there, and to make it possible for people to live freely within those borders, even though it is hard to imagine their lives under constant sniper fire and Muslim shelling. That ring around Sarajevo, some 20 km wide, was pierced by Muslim forces' artillery on both sides. Not only did the ring resist 34 Muslim offensives, but it also resisted attacks by the Rapid Reaction Force and the NATO air force when the people there offered military resistance. Serb Sarajevo defended itself courageously and it succeeded in defending itself without anybody's help. However, we lost it politically, and we shall always regret that. Because, if it already had to be that way, we are sorry for not having obtained Sanski Most, Gorazde, and Kljuc in exchange.

Nerves of Sarajevo Serbs Did Not Endure

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Had you been among the main negotiators in Dayton, Ohio, do you think you would have maintained Sarajevo?

[Karadzic] The pressure put on us was great, but at least it would not have gone for nothing. We would have at least exchanged it for Gorazde, Kljuc, and Sanski Most. However, we cannot help that now.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] There have been many accusations addressed to the leadership of the Serb Republic, as well as to you personally, saying that you are encouraging the Sarajevo Serbs to leave for political purposes.

[Karadzic] The Serbs moving out of Sarajevo is a political issue in the first place. That is, it has a political meaning, but it has not come about because the leadership wanted it so, but because people themselves wanted it, for they did not see their future within the Muslim-Croatian Federation. We wanted the Serbs to remain in Sarajevo at any price, after which, as a political force of 140,000, they would be able with our help to accomplish their rights there similar to the rights of Croats in Mostar. However, many people were not able to bear the pressure, and half of them left. When one half of the Sarajevo Serbs left, it was not easy to demand from the other half to stay and take up the struggle. In a way, the first half betrayed the other half, so we, as representatives of the state, were most obliged to help those people who endured the longest time. Accepting their desire to leave, we, as the state leadership, made all possible efforts to make it possible for those people to leave and to provide them with accommodation.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] How are you caring for them?

[Karadzic] The problems regarding accommodation are huge. All available facilities, from private to collective accomodation facilities and deserted or halfway destroyed buildings, have been employed for that purpose. Reception has been organized in all the neighboring municipalities, from Trebinje to Brcko, and particularly in the eastern part of the country, in order to avoid additional burdens on the western part that is already packed with refugees from the [Croatian] Serbian and Drvar Krajina. We have decided to allocate 20,000 parcels of land for individual building, and help people by giving them free land parcels, building permits, and standardized housing projects, as well as assist them with mechanization for digging foundations and cellars, and mounting of prefabricated buildings that are used in the United States for housing.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] It seems that the building of a new, Serbian Sarajevo is not a joke to you, as many have

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been referring to that project since President Milosevic suggested it. It is probably a way of overcoming the horrible shock caused by the loss of Sarajevo at the political negotiating table.

[Karadzic] What joke? These people, whom we are accommodating in various ways on a temporary basis, ought to be provided with lasting solutions. We have made a decision to build, that is, expand the existing Sarajevo area, that is, its parts which have remained in the Serb Republic according to the Dayton accords. This includes Trnovo, part of Ilidza municipality, part of Novo Sarajevo municipality, and Pale, all of which were Sarajevo's municipalities even before the war. We are considering adding Sokolac to these plans, so already now we could have 90,000 inhabitants in the city [referring to the new Serb Sarajevo], which is a solid basis for the preservation of the university, the expansion of the Clinical Center, the restoration of industrial capacities, and so forth. This will create many jobs which will add new strength to the city.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] The loss of Sarajevo will disturb the already weak expert, scientific, cultural, and cadre potential of the Serb Republic. What little intellectual elite has remained here after the first wave of emigration (and very little has remained, indeed) will leave now, because their urban way of living was possible only in that part of the city.

[Karadzic] Precisely for that reason the building of the new Serb Sarajevo has a deep sense. That will be a substitute for Sarajevo to those who had to leave, and who are still leaving it. We shall do anything to secure, in addition to the building of housing facilities—which is a priority—the building of other central facilities, offices, banks, theaters.... This means we see a possibility how to accommodate those 90,000 people who are now living between Lukavica and Sokolac, and to create room for the return of all those who want to return to their native, Sarajevo homeland. If we create new jobs, elements of cosmopolitan life, and cultural institutions, we reckon that in a year's time we could double the population of Serb Sarajevo. We are aware that only in a genuinely urban place are we able to gather the intelligentsia dispersed throughout the world, as well as other structures of the Sarajevo population that have deep-rooted urban habits.

Serb Sarajevo is neither a city nor a village, which members of the Presidency of the Serb Republic sitting in this building are deeply aware of. Their awareness is shown by blueprints for urbanization proposals that you will come across wherever you go in this building.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] In our country we have never been short of blueprints, whereas we have always lacked money.

[Karadzic] It would be natural that the international community help us, since it has so successfully cleansed Sarajevo of Serbs. Its conscience should tell it that it needs to take care of providing at least construction materials to every refugee family, so we can secure housing for them. Even though we expect that, we rely on our own resources the most. Our businessmen throughout the world are expressing readiness to help us and invest their money not only in humanitarian projects, but also in business projects as well. In that regard, we have started activities in many countries.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] The international community holds precisely the leadership in Pale responsible for the exodus of Serbs from Sarajevo, so it is hard to believe that it will give any money for the project.

[Karadzic] These accusations are hypocritical handwashing of those under whose patronage the greatest and most rapid ethnic cleansing of all took place. The international community has made a terrible mistake by giving all of Sarajevo to the Muslims. When Serbs leave one day—and it is obvious that they will—it will be quite clear that from Bascarsija to Visoko an ethnically pure, Muslim space has remained, in which one and a half million Muslims will live. If we assume that just a small percentage of them could foster Islamic terrorism after the war, in such a small area there will be 1,500 terrorists. These 1,500 terrorists could cause such a headache to Europe, all the more, as Nijaz Durakovic [leader of Social-Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina] said, since they look like other Europeans, and not like Arabs, so they will not be as easily recognizable. The international community will regret it, but it has to pay the price of its mistake. Whenever it acted to the Serbs' disadvantage, it acted actually to its own disadvantage.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] As we are talking in his big, nicely furnished office, the evening TV news is on, and the local television announces that sanctions against the Serb Republic have been lifted.

[Karadzic] The sanctions should not have been imposed only on us in the first place, because such one-sidedness of the international community contributed to the prolongation of war. However, better late than never. We are satisfied that the sanctions have been lifted, and we expect a lot from our ties with Yugoslavia. It would not be good if there occurred what the international community and the Muslim side eagerly desire—that Yugoslavia reject us and forcefully squeeze us into some Bosnia-Herzegovina. Remember what I am telling you:

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Bosnia-Herzegovina does not exist as a state, and will not exist as such, just like the federation between the Muslims and the Croats does not exist, for it is obviously falling apart. Therefore, we expect our mother country to take us without reserve into its economic and monetary space.

Friends Are Calling Me; They Are Worried

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] In reaction to the news on lifting the sanctions, Prime Minister Rajko Kasagic has received a message from Sarajevo that there will not be any trade or other serious connections between the Bosniak-Croatian Federation and the Serb Republic until the border between Yugoslavia and the Serb Republic is truly regulated and established.

[Karadzic] It is quite clear that Muslims want to lock us up in some Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they will be constantly making new conditions regarding our connections with Serbia and Montenegro. I have nothing against their conditions, which I, by the way, do not take into consideration at all. If I have to sacrifice some relations, then I will certainly sacrifice relations with the Muslims, rather than our close ties with Serbia and Montengro.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] A phone call from Danilo Lazovic interrupts us. Hanging up the receiver Karadzic says:

[Karadzic] He is a nice man, a great actor.... Friends are calling me, they are worried. They ask me, as we in Bosnia say, whether there are any novelties.

[Author's note] The president's daughter Sonja, who is director of the International Press Center in Pale, is expecting a baby. Friends are calling him also because of ambushes and checkpoints that IFOR [Implementation Force] troops are setting. The telephone rings again. The president conveys greetings from my colleague Ilija Guzina, former director of the local television.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Several days ago, as the Serb Republic Assembly was meeting, IFOR personnel carriers appeared at the entrance gate, trying to get in. After the guards' warning, they left. This was obviously a small pressure put on you and the Assembly, just to make you aware of their presence.

[Karadzic] Such things happen. Still, can anybody say that I made a single decision this year under pressure? There were many pressures, but I managed to evade them (laughs).

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Are you afraid?

[Karadzic] Do I look like a man who is afraid?

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Not at all. Because, as I set out on this journey, under impression of many rumors circulating in Belgrade, I expected to see an army of bodyguards around you, and I was quite worried whether I would be able to get through to you. To my surprise, except for a guard on duty at the entrance gate and one in the registration office, where my identification card was checked and my arrival reported to the secretary, nobody else was there, even though it was quite late. There was no trace of the huge army of bodyguards that people are talking about. Perhaps they hid somewhere. Perhaps your "batmen" hid behind some secret walls (he laughs). I remember that in the prewar times there were many more security checks and barriers to pass when I wanted to reach President Izetbegovic, for instance. The most difficult thing was to pass through a security ring made up of bodyguards coming from Sandzak. I am really bewildered. I expected to encounter a Chinese wall made up of robust Romanija guys. Or perhaps you know that IFOR troops will not come to pick you up themselves, but are waiting for you to come across them. In Prijedor, under Muslim pressure, they have established a checkpoint just for you. Are you moving freely throughout the Serb Republic?

[Karadzic] I am moving in my country like in my own house.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] And what about the Tribunal in The Hague?

[Karadzic] We do not recognize ad hoc the Tribunal in The Hague!

Why Karadzic Believes This War Was Needless

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] I know you do not have a high opinion of it, but what you have just said reminds me of Tito's historic statement: "I do not recognize this court...."

[Karadzic] This court is a political and legal sham of the West, and it should certainly be moved out of The Hague, so that the uninformed would not mix it up with the regular Court of Justice in The Hague. In view of the way it was formed and how it is behaving, it is the height of Western hypocrisy and a great shame on that West as well. It is particularly shameful because it did not consider crimes against peace, which, if it had, would have brought the real culprits for the war to trial.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Yes, because the Tribunal in The Hague is nothing like the Nuremberg trial, where crime against peace was the main charge. However, The Hague has no interest in this whatsoever. There has been little talk, or none at all, in public on this matter. True, I remember that famous U.S. journalist David Binder was

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one of the first to notice and draw attention to that by saying "...yes, it can, but Genscher should be the first [to answer in court]."

[Karadzic] The greatest crime in this war, as is specified by international law as well, is crime against peace, which was committed by the U.S. Government and the former U.S. ambassador to former Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman. When the Tribunal takes into consideration this crime as well, and brings the responsible parties to trial, conditions will be created for us to recognize it as well.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Why precisely Zimmerman?

[Karadzic] When all the three sides finally accepted the results of the Lisbon conference in mid-March 1992, then-U.S. Ambassador Zimmerman encouraged the Muslim side to abandon the negotiations. Today the final outcome is very similar to the one reached in Lisbon, but, unfortunately, it is preceded by the three and a half years of war, hundreds of thousands of dead, displaced, refugees, and mournful people without homes. The war was needless. It could have been avoided. The results of Lisbon and Dayton are similar, whereas the tragedy is irreparable. For this crime against peace someone has to pay. And I said who.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] It is really unbelievable, but on one of these tapes that I took from my personal archives, when I wanted to erase them and record new materials on them (which I do not even think about doing now), there is a news conference that you held after previously having worked the whole night through at the Sarajevo villa of Konak, where on 18 March 1992 the final agreement on a tripartite Bosnia was reached on the basis of the amended Lisbon documents.

[Karadzic] Please, let us hear the tape. You will hear, after four years, the moment of truth, the moment when the war, if Zimmerman and his tutors had wanted that, could have been avoided, when even Alija Izetbegovic himself agreed....

[Author's note] I play the tape. Karadzic's voice four years ago: "This is a great day for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia will stay as one whole, but made up of three parts. Last night we adopted elements and principles that undoubtedly say there will be three Bosnia-Herzegovinas, no matter how they are called, as three state entities based on the ethnic principle, but they will nonetheless take into consideration economic, geographic, and other criteria. If we comply with what has been agreed upon, there will be no reason for a civil war. Now we only need to agree on jurisdictions of joint bodies and jurisdictions in constituent units, which is a much easier job to do. Any of us has lost any possibility to dominate. Nobody will be able to dominate in all of Bosnia any longer."

Serb Republic Will Try Its Citizens Alone

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Just several days later, when the international community started work on the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you accused the international community of being a side in the conflict, and several months later you literally said: "I accuse the European and the international communities of war horrors. They are responsible, just like their most vociferous representatives, for war horrors, and nobody will ever be able to pardon them from that responsibility." You accused them almost three and a half years prior to their accusation brought against you. True, now you are being even more concrete.

[Karadzic] In the meantime things have become even clearer, and everybody has understood that the international community is actually the United States, and we all know that children do what their big daddy tells them to. In all this, Zimmerman was a very important factor.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Are you afraid that Belgrade could extradite you, if it happened to be put under some pressure or even blackmailed from abroad?

[Karadzic] I do not think that Serbia has taken on a commitment to extradite anybody. I think President Milosevic would reject with indignation any attempt by Americans to force such a commitment on him. We shall regard any charge that anybody in the world, even this ad hoc Tribunal in The Hague, files against any one of our citizens, including myself. We shall carry out an investigation, we shall bring those persons to trial if there are any well-founded grounds. But we cannot extradite our citizens, for neither our Constitution nor our national dignity allows us to do that. There is only one justice, and there is no need for us to believe more in those who have not observed its principles even so far. If this had not been so, the war would not have happened.

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] Do you travel to Belgrade?

[Karadzic] Now I think we have had enough of talk. I told you it was not a convenient time for big interviews, and lengthy stories....

[Rakocevic-Novakovic] No more talk. In my notebook a number of unused and tricky questions remain for some other time.

[Author's note] He is leaving, and he is not afraid, even though IFOR is all over the place.

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B-H: Serb Official Welcomes Some of Geneva Conclusions

LD1903162596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 19 Mar (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic [RS], today welcomed the Geneva meeting's insistence that the Dayton obligations must be fulfilled, especially the part concerning the unconditional release of all pows.

Krajisnik told journalists in Pale that he is surprised by the decision to hold the Geneva meeting while extensive preparations are going on for a summit in Moscow but he said he hopes the Geneva conclusions will force the Muslim side to fully comply with the Dayton provisions on the release of prisoners.

"We carried this out unilaterally in the hope that the international community would be resolute in its commitment to force the other side to observe its obligations," the RS speaker said.

In his view, the Geneva meeting was convened primarily to resolve increasing problems in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to prevent a new war between Croats and Muslims.

As for the normalization of relations and cooperation between the RS, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], which should be facilitated by the Geneva proposal to establish air traffic, Krajisnik said that the initiative should be approached with cautious optimism.

"I am not quite sure that this would be a big gain for us. We have nothing against an air link between the Muslim part of Sarajevo and the FRY. We are glad that Banja Luka is going to have it. However, we must be cautious since there are still attempts to force us into accepting unrealistic solutions to some issues."

Krajisnik repeated that partnership relations on an equal basis is the main condition for normal economic cooperation between the RS and the federation.

Referring to the elections, which were also discussed in Geneva, the RS speaker drew attention to the RS official attitude that the elections must be fair and that the RS is ready to organize them whenever the international community so decides.

"However, some aspects of the preparations look like an attempt to impose solutions, especially the proposal for the way the refugees will be allowed to vote. This is unacceptable and we want everyone to vote wherever they wish," Krajisnik said.

B-H: Serb Refugees Give Details on War Criminals

LD1903225396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1725 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Brcko, 19 Mar (SRNA)—[Bosnian] Serbs who have fled Konjic [Muslim-held town south of Sarajevo] and settled in Brcko say that war criminals Zdravko (son of Jakov) Mucic—Pavo, a Croat born in Konjic in 1954, and Zejnil Delalic, born in Ostrozac near Konjic in 1948, have been arrested in Vienna and Munich.

Witnesses, whose names are known by the SRNA correspondent in Brcko, say that Mucic was the commander of the [prison] camp in Celebic and Musala from the beginning of the war until 18 November 1992. In this period 33 Serbs from Konjic were killed in the camps in the most horrific way.

According to the same witnesses, Delalic came to Konjic at the beginning of the war and was elected chief of the territorial defense for Konjic, Jablanica, Prozor, and the Muslim-controlled part of the Hadzici municipality.

Owing to "exceptional merits in the struggle against the aggressor," Delalic was promoted to the rank of colonel at the beginning of the war, although his entire military education was the compulsory one-year training in the former Yugoslav National Army.

Before the war between Croats and Muslims began [1993], Mucic and Delalic fled Konjic in April 1993, having been accused of fraudulent sales of arms and ammunitions from the Igman production plant in Konjic.

"It is interesting," the witnesses say, "that several months ago Mucic phoned Serbs who had fled Konjic from Vienna so that they would testify in his favor should charges be brought."

B-H: Federal Police Enter Grbavica; War 'Definitely Over'

AU1903203196 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[Report by Aida Redzepagic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Redzepagic] Today, 19 March 1996, will be remembered as the day when the city was finally unified, a city which had never known any divisions. The symbolic gesture of putting up a new, real plaque on the police station in Grbavica—traditionally done by Interior Minister Avdo Hebib—marked the unification of Sarajevo, the way it always was, and the way it will always be. Minister Hebib confirmed this in his statement:

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[Hebib] I confirm that we have reintegrated all of Sarajevo, that all citizens will now be free in their city, they will be able to visit each other, to move back to the apartments they were forced to leave, to come back, and live with their neighbors. Serb Sarajevo never existed, there was only Sarajevo of Sarajevo citizens. We never said there was a Croatian or Muslim Sarajevo, but there was no Serb Sarajevo either. Sarajevo exists as the city of Sarajevo, the city of its citizens.

[Redzepagic] One hundred and five police officers have been assigned to new jobs. Destination—Grbavica, and they are surely the guarantors of full security of those who stayed and those who will return. Sarajevo police chief Enes Bezdrob said:

[Bezdrob] This is an exceptionally happy time, because when a person dreams of something and desires it for four years, then it is difficult to express your feelings. Grbavica has finally reintegrated into the city, where it belongs. Sarajevo citizens can go to Grbavica, and Grbavica citizens can go to Sarajevo. The time of war and insanity is definitely over. The only thing we need to do for citizens is to secure a normal life for them. A total of 105 police officers will be patrolling the area, that is, in Grbavica, Vrace, in the area of Novo Sarajevo. The national structure is in accordance with the 1991 census. I believe that this will guarantee the safety of all citizens. [passage omitted]

B-H: Minister Complains About Police Force in Grbavica

LD1903224796 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Sarajevo district of Grbavica was taken over today by the Muslim, and not the Federation, police, and in fact the same thing happened with the transfer of authority in Ilidza, Vogosca, Ilijas, and Hadzici, Jozo Leutar, deputy minister of internal affairs of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, said in a statement for Croat Radio Herzeg-Bosnia.

If there were any Serbs or Croats among the police force which entered Grbavica, they were policemen from the Muslim security service center of Sarajevo, and not those appointed by the Croat side, that is by me as deputy minister, Leutar said, adding that he had warned Carl Bildt's deputy, Michael Steiner, a few days ago what would happen today. Today I again asked for a meeting with Michael Steiner, and I will also fully inform the state organs of the Federation and representatives of the international community, Leutar said.

B-H: Kalesija Citizens Return Home After Years in Exile

AU1903215496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[Report by Abdulah Turkanovic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Turkanovic] Escorted by Implementation Force and police forces of the Kalesija police station, at precisely 1000 [0900 GMT] today several thousand inhabitants of the Kalesija villages—reintegrated into the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—returned home after four years in exile.

The several kilometer long column that today entered Memici commune included the entire political leadership of Kalesija municipality, headed by Governor (Dzevad Tusmanbegovic) who, after putting up the plaque bearing the name of the commune, addressed the citizens of Memici:

[Tusmanbegovic] Today we have entered the most important phase of the Dayton agreement implementation. It is precisely today that we have to recall the contribution of those who have made this peace possible. They are primarily the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and Interior Ministry members, as well as all patriotic forces. We can see that Memici has been torched and devastated; a lot of work will be needed, but I believe that with the cooperation of the municipality, state authorities, and humanitarian organizations, and your patient labor, we will very soon create the conditions that will enable you to live here. I know that the citizens of Memici are a hardworking and persistent folk; this used to be one of the most developed communes, not only in the Kalesija region, and I hope that our joint efforts will soon create the conditions that will enable all of you to come back. May your return be blessed.

[Turkanovic] Following the ceremony in Memici, the municipal delegation visited the [words indistinct] in Osmaci commune, where they held talks with representatives of the Serb citizens who have expressed a wish to remain in the part of Osmaci that is now a part of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In extremely sincere talks, the Serb citizens, headed by Brano Boskovic and Savo Ilic, were given answers to several questions; they were also given firm guarantees that they and their property would be completely protected.

B-H: Federal Police Take Over in Stari Grad Municipality

AU1903204296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The federal police force today also established authority in the parts of Stari Grad

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Municipality that according to the Dayton agreement belong to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The districts in question are Trebevic, Faletici, Donji Biosk, Mrkovici, and parts of Trnovo Municipality, which is a large piece of territory that opens the corridor toward Gorazde, Sarajevo Police Chief Enes Bezdrob said today. Some 250 federal police officers will be deployed for the reintegration of this part of Sarajevo.

B-H: Dayton Implementation Deadline in Dobrinja Postponed

AU1903204496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At yesterday's summit in Geneva, Carl Bildt demanded that a decision be made to extend the deadline for the implementation of the Dayton agreement in the Sarajevo districts of Dobrinja I and IV, republican Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic has announced.

The implementation deadline has been postponed indefinitely. Representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government and the Serb entity will agree at the meeting scheduled for 22 March on the details for the above-mentioned areas. Novi Grad municipality governor Ismet Cengic has asked citizens to be patient and not to venture into the area of their own accord.

B-H: Federal Forces Reintegrate Ustikolina, Praca

AU1903212496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 96

[Report by Anka Curovac]

[FBIS Translated Text] Federal police forces and the countersabotage protection unit entered Ustikolina this morning at 0600. They were followed by representatives of the Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Gorazde and Foca municipality, who entered Ustikolina some time after 1100. A brief ceremony of putting up the insignia was conducted before the future seats of Foca municipality and the police station, after which the representatives visited the graveyards and the site of the Turhan Emin Beg mosque, the oldest mosque in the Balkans that the Chetniks completely destroyed when they captured Ustikolina.

Ustikolina has been torched and destroyed to a great extent, but according to Zio Pestek, member of the Foca Municipality presidency, the municipal authorities will do everything to ensure a speedy reconstruction of the district, infrastructure, and economy. Today, the faces of Ustikolina citizens who flocked in great numbers to the town were joyous and determined to start the reconstruction of their torched homes.

Finally, at 1600 today, Praca was also reintegrated. With today's reintegration, the free territory of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has expanded by 180 kilometers, while the Bosnian-Podrinje Canton Gorazde—officially constituted on 18 March—is now linked territorially to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: Bosnian Serb Police Take Over Zvornik Villages

LD1903214696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1725 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Zvornik, 19 Mar (SRNA)—At a meeting today between representatives of the Zvornik Municipal Assembly and representatives of the Implementation Force [IFOR], the International Police Force, and the EU Special Mission, it was agreed that the police from the [Bosnian] Serb Republic would enter the villages of Kovacevici, Vitinica, Nezuk, and Zaseok [in Zvornik Municipality] which, under the Dayton Agreement, belong to the Serb Republic, on 21 March.

According to the president of the Serb Democratic Party Municipal Committee in Zvornik, Stevo Radic, the representatives of the International Police Forces and Russian troops of IFOR informed the Serb side of the situation in these villages and the representatives of the Zvornik Municipality requested that they enable the unhindered transfer of authority.

The precise timetable for the takeover by the Serb Republic Police Force was also agreed at the meeting, as well as the directions for their movements.

The representatives of Zvornik Municipality undertook to order a withdrawal of the Serb Police Forces in the event that the Serb Republic State Commission for Territorial Delineation reaches an agreement with the Croat-Muslim Federation Commission on an exchange of territory.

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B-H: $500 Million Trade Deficit Recorded in 1995

AU2003123796 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 19 Mar 96 p 20

[ONASA report: "Deficit of $500 Million"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 18 Mar—In trade with other countries, the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina last year recorded a deficit of $500 million, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Institute for Statistics reports.

The total value of imports stood at $523 million, and was 6.9 percent higher in comparison with 1994. Exports from the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina last year are estimated to be $23 million, which represents an increase of 412 percent, the same source said.

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Croatia: POLITIKA Interviews UNTAES's Schoups

AU2003095996 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 96 p 7

[Report by S. Beric: "We Shall Ensure Full Safety for the Serbs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Klisa, 11 March—"I hope that my troops will ensure full safety for the Serb population living in this region. As for the demilitarization, I shall do everything to make it apply to everybody and be careful to prevent gunrunning or the buildup of arms within the borders of eastern Slavonia. All the arms that we come across will be destroyed, which applies to both sides in this conflict," the new commander of the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia [UNTAES], Belgian General Jozef Schoups, told POLITIKA.

Schoups, the commander in chief of the military part of the UN operation, arrived in the Srem [Serbian variant of Srijem]-Baranja region on Friday, 8 March, and the day before yesterday he attended a traditional parade and took part in a medal-awarding ceremony for members of the Russian battalion in recognition of their participation in the UN mission. The parade was attended by Leonid Kerestedzhiyants, Russian ambassador to Croatia, the Russian military attache, and the former UNTAES commander, Belgian General Freddy van de Weghe.

We asked Gen. Schoups, as a NATO officer and reportedly one of the best generals in NATO, the former commander of NATO's reaction forces for Europe based in Germany, how he sees cooperation with the Russian troops within the UNTAES mission.

"The Russian battalion has already been cooperating with the Belgian battalion in this area for four years. In view of all that I have heard and experienced so far, I think that they are good and reliable soldiers, who are doing their job quite well," Schoups said, adding that much can be learnt from the Russians as well as the Belgian troops, who have been based in the Srem and Baranja regions for quite some time. He assessed their experience as useful and essential for future members of UNTAES.

Early this month, Gen. Schoups made a tour of the Srem and Baranja regions, where he visited the Russian and Belgian battalions and the UN observation posts in the exclusion zone.

Between 15 and 25 April, some 3,000 more troops are expected to arrive in Srem-Baranja, most of them from Pakistan and Jordan. At the moment their places of deployment and accommodation are being considered. After that, according to Schoups, the chosen locations have to be cleared of mines and provided with infrastructure and billeting, which means that "a major job is awaiting us," says Schoups.

"At present, I am based with my staff in Erdut, but later this month I plan to move the headquarters to Vukovar. From 1 April, Gen. Klein and my staff will be working together at the barracks managed by Gen. Loncar, which is a very important step in our future and I hope close cooperation," Gen. Schoups announced.

On Thursday 14 March, a ceremonial parade of the Belgian battalion will take place, as well as the official handover between the former UNTAES commander, Gen. van de Weghe, and the new commander, Gen. Schoups.

"My first task will be to explain to my troops what they are expected to do here, after which they will be deployed so that the first phase of the demilitarization can start. I am hoping for good cooperation, with people bringing and handing weapons over to us on their own initiative, in compliance with the Basic Agreement. They have one month to do this and after that we shall see how far we have gone in performing our duty," Gen. Schoups says.

Croatia: War Crimes Hearings Open on Vukovar Massacre

AU2003120096 Paris AFP in English 1136 GMT 20 Mar 96

[Article by Francois Vinsot]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The Hague, March 20 (AFP)—A UN tribunal began hearings Wednesday into three ex-Yugoslav army officers accused of ordering the deaths of 261 hospital patients, highlighting renewed emphasis on the hunt for war-crimes suspects.

The court was to hear evidence against Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic and Veselin Sljivancanin, charged over the November 1991 Vukovar hospital atrocity, in which non-Serbs were dragged from their hospital beds in the eastern Croatian town, and murdered.

The three officers, who are still at large, cannot yet by tried by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICT) here because its legal rules, based on Anglo-Saxon law, does not allow trials in absentia.

However, the public hearings are intended to highlight the court's intention of pursuing the issue of responsibility in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. [passage omitted]

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Croatia: Granic Says Blaskic To Surrender to Tribunal

AU1903180896 Paris AFP in English 1557 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 19 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat General Tihomir Blaskic, indicted for crimes against humanity, will surrender to the UN war crimes tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia before the end of March, the Croatian press reported Tuesday [19 March].

Blaskic, formerly chief of staff of the Bosnian Croat forces, the HVO [Croatian Defense Council], "has decided to turn himself in voluntarily to the tribunal before the end of the month," Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic told the pro-government VJESNIK daily.

He will "give himself up to The Hague because he is convinced of his innocence," Granic said.

Blaskic, 36, is one of six Croats indicted in November by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague over massacres of Moslems in the Lasva valley in central Bosnia between May 1992 and May 1993.

Born on November 2, 1960 in the village of Brestovsko, close to the central Bosnian town of Kiseljak, Blaskic worked his way through military academy in Belgrade and served as a captain in the then Yugoslav National Army (JNA).

A few hours after he was indicted by the war crimes tribunal, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, seen as supporting the hardline Croats, named him to a senior post in the Croatian Army, giving him Croatian nationality and protecting him from extradition.

He currently lives in a luxury hotel in the centre of Zagreb, protected by Argentinian and Herzegovinan bodyguards.

However at talks in Geneva Monday, Tudjman and Serbian counterpart Slobodan Milosevic agreed to hand over Blaskic and two Serbs, Drazen Erdemovic and Radoslav Kremenovic—held in Serbia after massacres in the former Moslem enclave of Srebrenica in July 1995.

Croatia, which backed and armed the Bosnian Croats in an eleven-month war against Bosnian Moslems in 1993 and 1994, has come under growing pressure from Washington to cooperate with the tribunal.

Tudjman last week reluctantly promised U.S. mediator John Kornblum that Croatia would fully cooperate with the international court.

Croatia: Susak Reported Recovering From Lung Surgery

AU2003112396 Paris AFP in English 1018 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, March 20 (AFP)—Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Susak, who is hospitalised in the United States, has undergone lung surgery, the Croatian weekly newspaper GLOBUS said Wednesday.

The defence ministry refused to confirm the report.

A ministry official on Monday confirmed that Susak, a heavy smoker, had been operated on in the Walter Reed military hospital in Washington on Saturday but refused to specify the nature of the surgery.

"The operation went well and he will soon be able to resume work," the official said.

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FYROM: Gligorov Receives Italian FM Agnelli

AU1903202696 Skopje MIC in English 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The President of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Kiro Gligorov yesterday received Susanna Agnelli, Italian Foreign Minister and current chairman of the European Union. The meeting was also attended by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Macedonia, Ljubomir Frckovski.

In the longer and friendly discussion, the two sides exchanged opinions on the development of the bilateral cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Italy, the realization of the process of association of the Republic of Macedonia in the European integrations and the current situation in the Balkans.

It was mutually assessed that the traditional and friendly cooperation between the two countries is progressing successfully, and that it can be advanced in all fields of mutual interest. The activities for the signing of the Agreement on trade and cooperation between the Republic of Macedonia and the European Union were assessed positively. In this context, President Kiro Gligorov underlined Macedonia's lasting orientation for long-term association with the European Union. He stressed that the Europeanization of the Balkans is the best alternative not only for the peace and cooperation in this part of Europe, but also for the overall economic progress and cooperation of the countries and nations in the region.

Precisely from this aspect, he underlined that any kind of imposed ideas about new and uncertain economic or any kind of other associations, especially in the regions of former Yugoslavia, are unacceptable. That would not only be contrary to the vital and long-term interests of a part of the Balkan countries, but it could present an overture to new uncertain and different divisions in the Balkans.

In the discussion, it was jointly assessed that the realization of the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the full normalization of relations between the countries of former Yugoslavia are priority issues that will have an influence on the overall stability and cooperation in this part of Europe.

At the meeting with Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, which was also attended by vice-president Jane Miljovski and Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski, an emphasis was placed on the questions from the bilateral cooperation with Italy, while on an international plan, the to-date cooperation between Macedonia and the EU was reviewed.

FYROM: Frckovski Accepts Invitation To Visit Greece

AU1803192796 Skopje MIC in English 18 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski sent a letter to the Greek Foreign Minister Teodoros Pangalos yesterday, accepting his offer to meet him in the Republic of Greece. In the letter, Frckovski expressed the conviction that the meeting would contribute to the intensification of the positive trend in the development of the bilateral relations, which started with the signing of the Interim Accord in New York on 13 September 1995.

The meeting is expected to take place by the end or the start of next month, while the exact date will be additionally coordinated.

FYROM: Commentary on Anti-Macedonian Rally in Sofia

AU1803201396 Skopje MIC in English 18 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Around fifty members and fans of VMRO-SMD (Union of Macedonian Associations) rallied in front of the embassy of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] in Sofia, on Friday, blocking the work of the Macedonian diplomatic mission for a couple of hours.

The rally of the Bulgarian nationalists was organized in protest against the arrests of "citizens with Bulgarian national self-consciousness,"—Trajan Godev, Tihomir Jarandziev, and Dimitar Nikolov from Strumica, who have been arrested by the Macedonian authorities.

The Macedonian ambassador in Bulgaria Georgi Spasov refused to accept the declaration drawn up by the demonstrators.

The Bulgarian nationalists, who were gathered in front of the Macedonian embassy in Sofia, carried banners and flags which said that the Bulgarians would strive to "unite the Bulgarian common spirit."

The organizers of the rally informed that they had sent a letter to Macedonian Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, saying that the "attempts to destroy the Bulgarian common spirit have not succeeded and will not succeed."

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FYROM: Ministry on Death of Corporal in Petrovic

96P20349A Skopje FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT in Albanian 11 Mar 96 p 4

[Unattributed article: "Communique of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia—Corporal Goran Zareski Is Dead"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 7 March 1996, at 1950 hours, Goran Zareski, from Prilep, who was in military service in the army of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], was admitted to the military hospital in Skopje. The patient was admitted 25 minutes after he suffered a gunshot wound in the guard house of the Petrovic barracks. He was wounded on the lower part of his face and on his neck. A team of doctors consisting of physicians from the military hospital and the Skopje Faculty of Medicine, headed by Prof. Dr. Ilija Vaskovi, was formed immediately. After resuscitation measures were taken, a complex several-hour operation was performed.

On the basis of a decision of the minister of health, Prof. Dr. Ilija Filipce, more specialists from the two institutions were added to the team. The expanded team found that all the measures taken were in accordance with the severity of the wound and stipulated measures for the further treatment of the patient. On Friday [8 March], the team found that the vital functions of the wounded soldier were improved but his health situation was complex and critical.

In the meantime, the investigative judge, Zdravko Vasilev, was fully informed about the case. According to the information which the Ministry of Defense has at present, the wound came from a bullet fired from the gun of a guard, Isuf Bislimi, who climbed through the window of the guards' bedroom, tripped over the foot of the bed, turned to the right and shot Corporal Goran Zareski, the communique of the Ministry of Defense stated.

The latest communique of the Ministry of Defense said: After the complex operation performed on Corporal Zareski on 7 March 1996, because of a bullet wound suffered the same day, the team of specialists from the Faculty of Medicine and the military hospital in Skopje continued measures of resuscitation and intensive care. All the necessary diagnostic, therapeutic and resuscitative measures were taken. The patient's vital functions were preserved by a number of methods of intensive care but, during the treatment, complications of the central nervous system, the kidneys and the cardiovascular system appeared.

Despite the partial improvements yesterday and the attention of the medical personnel and of his parents, who were with him all the time, Corporal Zareski's vital organs gradually began to cease functioning on the morning of 10 March and he died at 0750. It is with deep sorrow that we announce that the burial of our Corporal Goran Zareski will be held with full military honors on 11 March 1996 at 1400 in the Prilep cemetery, the final communique of the Ministry of Defense of Macedonia stated.

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Poland: Reaction to NIE Article on Oleksy Case

WS2003105196

[FBIS Report] Three major Warsaw vernacular dailies publish reports on the repercussions of the referent article on the Oleksy case carried by NIE weekly on 14 March. Written by Marek Baranski and entitled "Olin Kicks the Bucket, or About Oleksy's Innocence," the article discusses evidence in the so-called Oleksy case. The Office of State Protection [UOP] notified the Warsaw prosecutor's office that the article revealed state secrets.

GAZETA WYBORCZA, a large-circulation center-left daily, carried on 14 March a 200-word report on page 3 signed "KES," under the title "Where Did Leaks on the Oleksy Case Come From—the Wrong Prosecutor's Office?" The author quotes the head of the Warsaw prosecutor's office as saying that "the investigation into the information obtained by NIE should be headed by the Military Prosecutor's Office because that is most probably the source of the leak." An unidentified officer from the same office told GAZETA WYBORCZA that "no one from UOP has been arrested yet in connection with the leaks. Neither has any journalist been interrogated." "KES" goes on to add that "several UOP officers have been called on to testify."

ZYCIE WARSZAWY, a center-right daily, carried on 13 March a 700-word report under the title "The UOP Sues NIE," signed "MPO,PAP." "Reading NIE's revelations," says the article, "it is difficult to separate fact from the intention of clearing the former prime minister of charges." The report goes on to say that, according to UOP, "the NIE article contains information the author himself claims comes from investigative materials compiled by the Military Prosecutor's Office." "The charges claim," the author continues, "that UOP is leaking information intended to humiliate the left. This is one of the reasons that UOP Chief Gromoslaw Czempinski handed in his resignation following an argument with President Kwasniewski."

TRYBUNA, a leftist daily supporting the government coalition, carried on 14 March an interview with Marek Baranski, the author of the referent NIE article. The 850-word interview, conducted by Ewa Sadura, was published on page 4 under the title "Worthless Accusations." Asked about NIE's informers within UOP, Baranski admitted: "We do use their help. We savor the information they provide us with. The so-called Oleksy case cannot be presented in 'the only proper way,' proper only because it is presented by GAZETA WYBORCZA, ZYCIE WARSZAWY, or WPROST. It is considered unacceptable when leaks come from somewhere else."

Poland: Attacks on Public Officials Cited

WS1903150696 Poznan WPROST in Polish 17 Mar 96 pp 25-26

[Article by Joanna Kluzik and Aleksandra Zawlocka, in association with Krzysztof Grabowski: "Threatened"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Prosecutors, judges, customs officials, inspectors of the Supreme Chamber of Control, policemen, journalists. They all draw the hatred, frustration, and antipathy of corrupt officials, the big fish of semilegal business, gangsters, or ordinary madmen. They have all beem increasingly targeted as victims of brutal assault, bombing attacks, and arson. The perpetrators in most of these cases have not been identified or sentenced. "These impudent acts of violence are especially threatening to judicial officials," warns Andrzej Cubala, spokesman of the Ministry of Justice.*

There have been repeated attacks in courtrooms on judges, prosecutors, and witnesses; 746 instances of breaching the majesty of the court have been reported within the period 1992-95. These include 290 cases of assault, battery, and slander, and one shooting incident. In addition, there have been 100 cases of intrusion into judiciary buildings and 300 anonymous calls informing of bombs.

The perpetrators of the most drastic act of vengeance—for instance, in Opole, caustic acid was poured over Prosecutor Wiolantyna Mataniak—still remain unknown. A year earlier, the car of the Lubliniec prosecutor was blasted by explosives. The bomb was professionally detonated by remote control as the prosecutor was approaching his car. In Przasnysz, the courthouse was set afire, causing damage worth several billions of [undenominated] zlotys.

During a Gdynia District Court hearing on alimony payments, an ex-serviceman released the safety catch of a grenade. As a result, the judge and the plaintiff were injured. An attempt to set fire to a courtroom during a trial in the Rzeszow courthouse was foiled. A man displeased with a court verdict in a district labor court in Chorzow stabbed a judge in the back with a knife.

The victim of the attack spent several weeks in the hospital. Prosecutor Marzena Kowalska, the public prosecutor in the trial of the notorious [Otwock mafia leader] Pershing, has been granted special police custody. The entire team of judges involved in the case was escorted to the courtroom by an antiterrorist squad.

"Acts of vengeance are most often committed in civil and family suits, not penal cases, though the reverse would seem to be true," Andrzej Cubala claims. "We are prepared to use special means in extraordinary

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cases, yet around-the-clock protection for all judges and prosecutors is out of the question; it would paralyze the judiciary system."

At the beginning of March, court police posts will be established in court buildings and prosecutors' offices. These guards will protect court witnesses and public prosecutors.

Those who want to intimidate customs officers do not stop at threats. They carry out sentences.

An employee of the customs office in Gdynia was beaten at the end of January of this year. Badly battered, he was taken to the hospital. The police are carrying out an investigation. A female customs officer was pushed out of a moving train near Poland's western border in 1992; she was killed. Those responsible for the crime were never found. Hydrocloric acid was spilled over another woman customs officer in Warsaw that same year. This time again, the police were unable to track down the perpetrators of the crime. In January 1993, a bomb completely destroyed the car of the head of the operations department of the customs office in Zgorzelec [town near border crossing with Germany]. Two years ago the director of this office, Jan Bohdanowicz, was assaulted in front of his house and savagely beaten. A few weeks later an explosive was wired to the driving rods of his company car. The driver spotted the device after driving more than a dozen kilometers. Fortunately, the bomb did not explode. This was one of the few instances in which the police were able to identify the actual offenders, who clearly had acted on instructions from other people. It was also ascertained that the explosive materials used in the bombing attack on the customs officer were supplied by a policeman. The police were unable to discover the true identity of those who had ordered the killing.

Marian Chmielewski, an employee of the operations unit of the customs office in Olsztyn, was attacked last February. Two men forced their way into his flat. He was badly beaten until he lost consciousness. It took two months for him to recover in the hospital. The prosecutor's office in Zary dicontinued proceedings in the case.

According to police estimates, approximately 300 attacks on policemen are reported each year. At the same time, there is a rise in the number of acts of revenge for disclosing information about crimes and a rise in the number of attempts to force the ending of investigations. The police refuse to provide detailed information on the subject. "Criminals were afraid to attack militiamen in the past; now they have no such scrupples when confronted with the police," an officer from central police headquarters told us.

"The screams of my daughter and my wife woke me. I stood in the corridor thinking: They've set my apartment on fire, after all," Jerzy Jachowicz, a newpaper reporter for GAZETA WYBORCZA recalls. His apartment in Pruszkow [a Warsaw suburb] was burned down on the night of 22 April 1990. Jachowicz and his family escaped by jumping out of a window. He and his daughter were fortunate enough to survive. His wife was not.

Jachowicz had ignored repeated threats after publishing a string of articles on the SB [communist secret police], the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the militia. He made efforts to have the trials of the assassins of Father Popieluszko and Grzegorz Przemyk [son of Solidarity activist killed in 1983] reopened, searched out witnesses, and made records of their testimony. Discovering evidence of a cover-up in the investigations, he was able to trace strings leading to officials on active duty, some even occupying high-ranking positions. The inquiry into the arson of Jachowicz's apartment lasted a year and a half and was finally discontinued. No culprit was ever found.

"If it turned out that my apartment was set afire by criminals, I would have felt relief," Jerzy Slawomir Mac, a journalist of the WPROST weekly told us. Mac is coauthor of a number of widely commented articles on such subjects as the financial and economic ties of SdRP [Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland], one of which was titled "Friends Associated" (issue No. 4). He also helped police discover drug dealers from a drug ring. In February he chased three burglars from his door. The following day he was shown pictures at the police station and asked to identify the men. He identified two of them, one of whom was also a drug dealer he had earlier helped to identify for the police and was the son of a neighbor. A few days later Mac called his wife to say he would be home early. There were four burglars at his door when he got there. The journalist made a lucky escape and notified the police. Once again he was shown photographs at the police station. He identified another man; yet even this time no one was detained. Later, after a series of threats, his apartment was set on fire [2 March at 0400]. A week ago, the Warsaw office of WPROST received a postcard saying: "Mac, you S.O.B., that's not all. The game's not over."

"We'll get you, you scribblers" the ill-famed Misiek yelled over the telephone to reporters of EXPRESS WIECZORNY. He is thought to be head of the Nadarzyn gang and, as reported in one of the articles in that paper, suspected of ordering the killing of the so-called Kielbasa [notorious gang leader]. Two years earlier similar threats were ignored by Mariusz

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Popielarz, a reporter of the Gdansk office of SUPER EXPRESS.

In July 1994, a journalist was lured and kidnapped by gangsters. Popielarz had written articles on racketeering and extortions in Gdansk. Masked assailants tried to force him to reveal the names of his informers, to persuade him to work with the gang. He was beaten severely. Subsequent investigations proved inconclusive. SUPER EXPRESS hired security guards. The threats have continued.

Two months later Popielarz was awakened by a rumbling noise. "I thought it was a gas explosion," he recalls. The entire apartment was filled with smoke. He wanted to call for help but the telephone was dead. Somebody had cut the wires. He was lucky, however. The oil had dripped into a crack under the doorstep and exploded there. If not for that explosion, he might have awakened too late for help.

Police statistics show that, in the past six years, the number of acts of violence aimed at journalists and public officials has doubled.

Spiral of Aggression

	Number of Attacks on Public Officials
1989	1,591
1990	2,115
1991	2,685
1992	3,067
1993	2,990
1994	3,449
1995	3,209

Poland: Sejm Commission Investigates 'Moscow Loan'

WS1903142196 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 15 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by "KAC": "Extraordinary Commission. Moscow Loan: On a UOP Mission in Moscow and Miller's Crimean Holiday"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The purpose of the visit paid by officers of the Office of State Protection [UOP] to Moscow in the early 1990's was to obtain legal assistance in connection with the so-called Moscow loan and had nothing to do with any plot against the Polish left," Zygmunt Pastorczak, chief of the Control and Supervision Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, told deputies yesterday [14 March]. He thus denied statements issued by Leszek Miller, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers. Apart from Pastorczak, the extraordinary Sejm commission established to investigate the legality of proceedings in the Oleksy case interviewed Commander Stanislaw Terlecki of the Military Information Services and Mieczyslaw Gil, former deputy of the Citizens Parliamentary Club.

During a hearing before the commission, Miller repeated a statement he issued three years ago that two trips made by UOP officers to Moscow in 1991 and 1992 were political in nature. He claims that our secret services approached their Russian counterparts with an offer to cooperate in fighting the Polish left. Miller refused to disclose his source of information.

According to a coalition deputy, Pastorczak said that the delegation of six men he headed during the Moscow visit consisted of two officers who also had other assignments. He did not know what they were, only that they were following instructions issued personally by [former] Interior Minister Milczanowski. The commission plans to interview three former UOP officers in connection with the case.

Testifying yesterday in front of the commission, Mieczyslaw Gil was the first to speak about the so-called Moscow money. "The whole case came up by coincidence (in a speech Gil delivered before the Sejm in 1991—ed.). I spoke mainly about the visit paid by representatives of the Social Democracy of the Republic of Poland [SdRP]—Leszek Miller and Wieslaw Huszcza (SdRP treasurer at the time)—to a recreation center in Crimea at exactly the same time the future organizers of the Moscow coup stayed there, among them [former] Interior Minister Boris Pugo."

He added that, at the time, he saw the leaning of the SdRP toward Moscow as a major threat to Poland. Also now, he claims, a part of the SdRP exhibits strong pro-Moscow sympathies and is vulnerable to Russian influence.

Poland: Sejm Passes Law on Real Estate for Foreigners

WS1903143296 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 16-17 Mar 96 p 19

[Article by Hanna Nowakowska: "Real Estate; Foreigners Closer to Land"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Foreign individuals and companies will find it easier to purchase real estate in*

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Poland. Yesterday the Sejm passed a law that liberalizes the current regulations.

Now it will be discussed in the Senate. Since the law has been put on a fast legislative track, a lot seems to indicate that the new regulations will be operative in May at the latest.

The government attaches great importance to this law. It is to be seen as an asset in the talks on Poland's admission to the OECD, which is made up of the 26 richest countries in the world; the talks are scheduled for April. However, the decision made by the Sejm yesterday does not mean that the new law will remove all of the difficulties foreigners experience in trying to buy real estate in Poland.

Right now, if a foreign citizen does not have a permit from the Internal Affairs Ministry [MSW], he cannot buy land, a house, or a mortgageable apartment. Once the new law enters into force, he will not need a permit if he wants to buy an apartment. In the case of land or house purchases, permits will not be needed by foreigners who have lived in Poland for five years (that is, foreigners who have the so-called permanent-stay cards) or foreign companies (if they want to buy plots of land in towns, plots not to exceed 0.4 hectares).

Without a permit from the MSW, foreign citizens will be unable to buy majority stakes in trading companies that own real estate. The current law does not say anything about this. Foreigners who have already bought such majority share blocs without a permit from the MSW will have one year to complete the formalities.

The new law will make the permit-issuing procedures considerably simpler. For example, promises are to be sanctioned by the law: A foreign citizen can be given a promise that he will obtain permission to buy real estate. Such promises will be applied in the case of foreign companies that present bids to buy real estate.

The MSW head would not need the consent of all of the ministers in order to issue a permit. He would need approval only from the national defense and agriculture ministers. [passage omitted]

Poland: Economic Cooperation Minister Interviewed

WS2003105296 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 15 Mar 96 p 5

[Interview with Jacek Buchacz, Polish minister of foreign economic cooperation, by Urszula Kujawska; place and date not given: "I Will Just Be Doing My Job"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Kujawska] Data provided by the Central Office of Statistics [GUS] and the National Bank of Poland [NBP] confirm that exports are growing. Should [our] foreign trade be viewed in such an optimistic way? What is the state of our foreign trade turnover in comparison with what is going on in the entire economy?

[Buchacz] Unfortunately, we have to start with some figures, though they are not the most important thing. It was a real treat for me to present our achievements in Baltimore, at the meeting of representatives from the G-7 with representatives of the countries that are undergoing reform. The increase of our gross domestic product [GDP] is [currently] 7 percent a year, investment expenditures have grown by 19 percent [in comparison with the previous year] and our industrial production by 9 percent. These are facts that will easily be remembered because in Europe 7-percent growth in the GDP is rather exceptional.

Other indicators, like the lower indebtedness level in relation to the GDP, are also an encouragement for preserving the current direction of macroeconomic processes—this despite the relatively high inflation rate, which also has an influence over long-term economic decisions. Inflation, of course, should be limited, but now this cannot be the main task of the economy. More important is to encourage maintenance of the high rate of economic growth and limiting unemployment. This point of view is represented not only by my department.

Matched with this data, exports look quite good. But, according to the Single Administrative Document, which registers the foreign trade turnover, both exports and imports have similar dynamics. This, nonetheless, looks slightly different from the NBP [National Bank of Poland] data regarding payments. Our import dynamics are currently 34.8 percent and exports 34.6 percent; the deficit is $5.8 billion, and the trade volume exceeds $52 billion.

Everyone involved in the processes that influence the situation in foreign trade should primarily be concerned with lowering that deficit in the coming years. Still, this will not be easy.

[Kujawska] What factors do you consider to be the main obstacle for an equalization of the balance?

[Buchacz] We are open to foreign cooperation, and we have introduced substantial liberalization with regard to tariff protection of Polish merchandise and producers against foreign competition. In accordance with Poland's association agreement with the European

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Union, other reductions of customs rates are planned to be introduced up to the year 2000. We know what will be happening in these markets and in [our] contacts with EFTA [European Free Trade Association]. Before the end of next year, about 95 percent of the products exchanged among the CEFTA [Central European Free Trade Association] countries will be assigned a zero customs rate—and this regards both industry and agriculture, while the products of the latter are, as we know, "sensitive" goods. This is unprecedented liberalization.

We know how the liberalization is going to proceed, and we also know that it will be difficult to balance the tendencies that promote proimport activities.

The competitiveness of Polish exports will also be limited by the growth of internal consumption—due to the increase of the GDP. Higher living standards of the people will result in a decrease of exports in the same way as our foreign exchange policy—which is unfavorable for exports.

Still, if we are trying to stimulate economic growth and secure the best possible functioning of the economy, this is done, after all, to influence the citizens' income and the living standards of society. What is more, we aim for the living standards of the inhabitants of Poland to be not lower than that in the top European countries in approximately a decade. And that is, after all, what the exporters have to keep in mind. As a consequence, the difference between production costs in Poland and, for example, in Germany will be continually getting smaller, even if for nothing else than the continually growing costs of labor in Poland.

[Kujawska] How, then, are you going to prop up exports, taking into consideration that the currently applied mechanisms have a very small impact, and some of them are just not functioning?

[Buchacz] I do not agree with that opinion. What we have done so far is undoubtedly helpful for exports. Here I have in mind the return of the VAT [value-added tax], tax abatements for investments that are related to exports, and the practice of subsidizing loans.

I agree, however, that the activities of the Corporation for Export Credit Insurance [KUKE] does not have a big role, inasmuch as only 1 percent of export transactions with Western countries are insured there. This is a drop in the bucket of needs.

Currently, 70 percent of Polish exports are directed toward West European markets—which is due to, among other things, the fact that production costs in Poland are lower than those in West European countries. Yet, this is not going to last, because the difference will soon be negligible. Therefore, I believe it is necessary to redirect Polish exports.

While sustaining the markets that are sustainable in the West, we have to search for opportunities connected with other, mainly East and Central European markets, as well as with some far-away areas such as, for example, Southeast Asia. We have to create a financial system of supporting exports and Polish investors. Like a maniac, I still keep talking about the need to create a financial system supporting the export of investments, although so far we have not been particularly successful in that. Now I am determined enough to make that decision on my own responsibility. This is because we have already lost at least a year. Last year, in May, we had everything prepared for setting up institutions like the Polish Guarantee Fund, the International Guarantee Corporation, the Investment and Exports Fund, and the Collective Corporation. It turned out, however, that they aroused controversy. Discussions and the working out of different alternatives began, and, finally, a year was gone. And still we have no institutionalized support for the export of investments, just like before. Therefore, I see this year as being lost. I hope that in the near future the Council of Ministers [RM] will decide at least about KUKE and about expanding its activities so that it will be able to give guarantees and securities. The existing regulations do not allow for that possibility; so, even if the decision of the RM is positive, it will be six months before the bill is amended. I consider this to be one of the most important factors for our economy.

Not waiting for parliamentary regulations supporting cooperation with East European countries, we have been holding intensive talks with Ukraine. The talks are at an advanced stage, which is satisfying, because I believe that this is congruent with our particular raison d'etat. Ukraine is trying to sustain its independent policies, including economic ones, and not accept CIS regulations. Creation in that particular country of guarantee funds that would be similar to ours and would equally participate with us in the risk taken by Polish and Ukrainian businessmen could help the growth of cooperation. These institutions would diminish the risk—among others—by checking the credibility of a partner. I think that, when the government makes the appropriate decisions, fairly soon we will be able to expand the already existing structures, do away with the most controversial plan of joining state and private capital, and proceed with setting up the Collective Corporation, for, whatever one can say about the State's Treasury, it is, anyway, not powerful enough to have a large influence over the activities of the corporation—I do not mean the corporation's cooperation with East European countries, but also with CEFTA.

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For many years to come, Polish big business will be unable to invest in West Europe. Therefore, it is only natural that we have to direct our interests toward Eastern markets. Our estimates show that $1 invested in Ukraine may be 100 times as productive as in Germany. Even if these are excessive estimates, investments in the East are still more profitable.

[Kujawska] You have chosen to make individual decisions that do not have public support and that are critically viewed by different circles. Where does this determination come from?

[Buchacz] There always comes a moment for self-examination. This happened to me on 19 December of last year, when it turned out that this government might collapse at any moment and I would not necessarily be included in the next one. Postponing decisions and allowing for long and futile discussions about instruments for supporting exports—this I consider to have been my greatest fault. I was afraid of arousing controversy and yielded to criticism instead of firmly defending my proposals about the rationality of which I have been absolutely confirmed. I believe this is the last moment to amend this fault. Now I will be just doing my job, firmly presenting programs that have been worked on by us. I am sure that, when they start functioning, in a year or two, they will be judged in a completely different way.

Today there are many controversial things. There is the issue of our relations with the East. Even an expansion of KUKE's activities turns out to be questionable, even though the corporation has been set up in order to diminish risk. The institution is profitable, although no more that 1 percent of our export transactions are insured there; and this concerns mainly transactions with the West.

Practically speaking, there is only one question—it regards the control over KUKE. As I see it, if this matter is put under the authority of the minister of finance, I will stop being interested because I will no longer be involved in this issue. If, however, the minister of finance arrives at the opinion that the minister of foreign economic cooperation can be an equally good supervisor of the State's Treasury, I will take these matters into my own hands, especially the matters concerning guarantees. This is because I can accept that the insurances that are annually provided for by the budgetary bill should remain under the authority of the minister of finance. And, with regard to guarantees for investments and others, the minister of foreign economic cooperation must have a decisive word about this because these things have a decisive influence over the development of international trade and economic cooperation.

[Kujawska] Many businessmen are critical about the current foreign exchange policy of the state, which is unfavorable to exporters. Devoting more means for imports goes against the declared proexport policy of the state, and it may cause the failure of many companies and, in the near future, an increase in unemployment. This is not a new phenomenon in the history of our economy.

[Buchacz] That is exactly why I cannot agree with the proposals included in "Package 2000." The project presented there is absolutely not congruent with the interests of foreign economic cooperation. We are watching the situation, and, at the same time, we are working on our own vision of what is going to be happening in foreign trade up to the year 2000. We disagree with the stipulations included in "Package 2000" concerning the future dynamics of foreign trade in Poland.

I absolutely do not understand what the basis was for stipulating that, in two years, the deficit, which is so big, equaling almost $6 billion, could be turned into a surplus. This is obviously unrealistic, especially because these stipulations are not connected with any proposals concerning instruments that would enable achieving that. Admittedly, it is written in "Package 2000" that exports are to be the driving force of the economy, but there is no mechanism that would favor that tendency.

Besides, in my opinion, this is not necessary because, as long as 80 percent of imports are connected with import of investments, as it is now, this has a good influence over the whole of the economy. The aim is, after all, to increase its competitiveness—that is, to produce more advanced products, of better quality, and export those that have a large added value [technologically, as compared to raw materials]. I think that only then will it be possible to reconsider the proposals included in "Package 2000."

There are also other things about "Package 2000"—for instance, the issue of social problems. It would be good to know the rationale of the minister of finance in declaring the lowering of the income tax for corporate bodies to the level of 32 percent. The minister must know that the tax is already, on average, about 34 percent and not 40 percent, as is officially maintained. In this situation, is it really possible to lower this tax to 32 percent and not cause a major breakdown in the economy? What is missing are real and verifiable data to support these theses. Hence, I believe that these problems will still be discussed in the future.

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Poland: Officers Leaving Armed Forces

WS2003115796 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 19 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "PPW": "MON Personnel Department Report; Are Officers Running Away From the Army?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A report submitted to the leadership of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] by General Jozef Buczynski, Personnel Department director, claims that officers are currently leaving the Armed Forces in huge numbers for financial reasons.

Military sources say that several thousand officers submitted resignations, fearing severance pay cuts. They are predominantly highly qualified captains and majors in the Air Force and signal corps, who have recently become eligible for retirement. Outside the military, they are sought-after experts and earn much more money.

Gen. Buczynski's report does state, however, that the situation is not as sinister as it might seem. The number of men to leave the Armed Forces this year will not be much different from the figure for 1995.

A statement issued by MON states that Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski reassured officers that, for the time being, no changes in pensions or severance pay for the cadres are predicted. Dobrzanski declared that MON will "defend the solid principles of military service."

Poland: Poll Shows Rightist Parties Gaining Support

WS2003110296 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 20 Mar 96 p 2

[Report by "KNYSZ" under the "Poland in Brief" rubric: "The Right Moves Up"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If parliamentary elections were held over the next few months, five parties would make it into the Sejm: the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], Solidarity, the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland [ROP], Freedom Union [UW], and the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]. Support for the SLD has slightly waned and is now at 22 percent. Solidarity has the support of 15 percent, Jan Olszewski's ROP 12 percent. UW and the PSL broke even with 9 percent. The Union of Labor, the Movement of 100, and the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms, each having netted the support of 3 percent of respondents, would remain outside parliament.

The poll was carried out by the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP] between 9 and 12 March on a representative sample group of 1,059 adult Poles.

Poland: Former KPN Leader on Right-Wing Integration

WS1803133596 Warsaw Radio RMF FM Network in Polish 0705 GMT 15 Mar 96 (tentative)

[Interview with Krzysztof Krol, former chairman of the Confederation for an Independent Poland, by Konrad Piasecki, at the Radio RMF FM studio in Warsaw on the "Guest of the RMF FM Morning Program"—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Piasecki] There are several psychological theories. One of them says that the main thing is how other people view you. According to another theory, the main thing is how you view yourself. Do you feel inside that you are still deputy chairman of the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland] parliamentary club?

[Krol] Primarily, I feel that I am Krzysztof Krol. As for the post of deputy chairman of the KPN club, I resigned several days ago. I pursue one principle in life: If a dispute involves me, to be able to participate in it I prefer not to hold any post. There was one particularly distressing thing: My friend Adam Slomka used as an argument against my deputy chairmanship of the club the fact that I am [KPN Chairman] Leszek Moczulski's relative. I immediately made up my mind: No, Adam. If you say such things, I will resign. My relationship with Moczulski did not upset you when I was in prison; it did not upset you during many years of our activity. If it upsets you now, I will resign. However, this does not mean that I will not be involved in the parliamentary club's activities, given that I am responsible for all political activities within the KPN structure. Therefore, my position has not changed much.

[Piasecki] You said: my friend Adam Slomka. Is he your friend or your former friend?

[Krol] I am an optimist and I prefer to say friend, although it is undoubtedly sad when friends do such things. I do not even mean myself; I mean a number of more important issues. The first one is: I believe that there is no other option than the integration of the right wing. It is of secondary importance what will happen to specific parties. It is much more important to build a large bloc. I think this is currently my principal task. This, however, also became a pretext for accusing me because it was said that I was no longer engaged in the KPN's and its parliamentary club's activities and, instead, had become engaged in the affairs of the patriotic camp and in the issue of the right wing's integration. Allegedly, this was disadvantageous for the KPN. In my opinion, this was advantageous given that the time of independent groups had expired, at least with regard to the coming legislative elections. However, this

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does not diminish my vigor or change my opinion that I should continue to do everything in the same manner as before.

[Piasecki] Adam Slomka and his faction, including Mrs. Janina Kraus, who was elected new chairman of the parliamentary club, claim that your departure will facilitate the task of uniting the right-wing parties. For instance, they say that Leszek Moczulski will never reach an agreement with Jan Olszewski after the personal file case [reference to Olszewski's allegations that Moczulski collaborated with the Polish People's Republic's special services]. There are claims that, in light of personal animosities within the rightist movement, no political accord can be achieved without replacing the leaders. Do you think this theory is erroneous?

[Krol] Undoubtedly, these kinds of problems exist in many political groups, or even in all of them. The KPN is not free of them, either, which is further proof that we are a normal party. However, I believe that a strange thing has occurred. The KPN held a congress in February that elected Leszek Moczulski to the post of party chairman and the party's new leadership. It would seem that the situation after the congress should be as follows: Certain decisions were made at the congress; hence, we should get down to work. Meanwhile, something different happened. The Political Council elected Leszek Moczulski to the post of parliamentary club chairman. Thus, Leszek Moczulski and not Mrs. Janina Kraus is the parliamentary club's chairman.

[Piasecki] She claims the opposite.

[Krol] This issue should be resolved by the KPN leadership. It is unambiguously determined by the KPN's regulations, which envision that the Political Council has the right to appoint the parliamentary club's presidium. I, too, filed my resignation with the Political Council. At the same time, it seems that disintegration and integration processes are going on simultaneously within the right wing.

[Piasecki] One could even formulate a rule: The number of interparty conflicts varies inversely with the size of a political group. This has been a very observable trend in Poland recently, particularly when one looks at the BBWR [Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms] or the KPN. Recently there were a lot of squabbles within your parties.

[Krol] You could just as easily mention all of the other political groups.

[Piasecki] The Democratic Left Alliance, for instance, is different.

[Krol] I mean the decent political groups. The right wing's integration is going to produce changes in the hierarchy. If someone is an important leader of a specific party, he already has a position. Meanwhile, in the process of the right wing's integration, he will have to fight for such a position because there will be at least several other people competing for the same position. I think that middle-level activists, especially from local organizations, are afraid of integration, which is the principal cause of conflicts and disputes. Another reason is that it is very hard to persuade these people to accept new ideas and new concepts of activities. Integration may end up a great success, but it may also end in failure. People are accustomed to their small parties, and I am not surprised. However, I do not share their standpoint. I believe that there is no alternative to integration, and, furthermore, I am sure that the KPN will emerge from the integration process as an active player, although not without problems. It is sad that Adam Slomka will no longer be there.

[Piasecki] In the KPN or in the integrated rightist bloc?

[Krol] I think in both. As I say, it is sad because Slomka is my friend who chose a very bad path.

[Piasecki] Jan Olszewski was recently promoted to be the leader of the right wing of the political scene. Public-opinion polls, too, point to this. Is unification possible under Olszewski's leadership, and will the KPN accept this?

[Krol] It is not a problem of leadership. We can unite with any party; Leszek Moczulski talked to Jan Olszewski before the presidential election, as well as after the election. The patriotic movement, in which the KPN is an active member, maintains contact with the ROP [Movement for the Revival of Poland]. We suggest that there should be no personal leadership. Instead, there should be a union of political groups full of goodwill—ROP, Solidarity, the Christian-National Union, the Movement for the Republic, the KPN, and so on and so forth. I think it is beginning to take shape. Undoubtedly, the best parties will join that union, the best-known, the most active and responsible—nobody knows which one.

[Piasecki] What if Jan Olszewski says: We will join the integrated right movement; ROP will undertake the task of consolidating it; I will be the leader of the integrated right. Will the KPN say no?

[Krol] It will not. A leader should be elected. Very well. Mr. Olszewski, please come to the congress of an integrated right wing, where the entire patriotic camp will be represented, and we will elect a leader. Perfect, wonderful. We need this. However, neither Jan

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Olszewski nor Lech Walesa mnor Leszek Moczulski nor Wieslaw Chrzanowski can say: Band together around me! It will really be unproductive. People should band together around a cause, and personal ambitions should be hidden deep in one's pocket. It is due to our ambitions that the communists are currently in power.

Poland: UW Lodges Complaint on Disposal of PZPR Assets

LD1503205096 Warsaw TVP Television First Program Network in Polish 1830 GMT 15 Mar 96

[Relayed by Warsaw TV Polonia]

[FBIS Translated Text] A group of Freedom Union [UW] deputies have lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Tribunal against the amendment of the law on the takeover of the assets of the former Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], which increases the rights of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic to the assets of the PZPR.

In 1992, the Constitutional Tribunal acknowledged such a resolution of the situation to be unjustified, not in a ruling however, but in the written justification of the ruling. If the Constitutional Tribunal were now to incline itself toward the UW complaint, its [new] ruling will then go to the Sejm. Deputies could recognize it as invalid by a two-thirds majority vote. Alternatively, they will have to change the law within six months or it will cease to be valid.

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Romania: PUNR Leader Claims Hungary 'Undermining' State

AU1903120596 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 13 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Dorina Baesu: "PUNR Is Detonating a Bomb; Magureanu Allegedly Whispered to Funar That Hungary Is Undermining Romania; SRI Is Duty-Bound To Give Explanations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The President of the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR] Gheorghe Funar said on the "Crossfire" program of the Tele 7ABC television channel on Monday [11 March] evening that 4 percent of Hungary's gross national income is intended for secret actions aimed at undermining the Romanian state. Funar said that he had received this information from Virgil Magureanu [head of the Romanian Intelligence Service—SRI] during the meeting that the latter held with PUNR parliamentary groups.

The Romanian National Unity Party parliamentarians said that Virgil Magureanu informed them that the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] possesses all the necessary structures for self-governing that might become operational even in case of a "separation" from Romania. Magureanu said that the irrendentist forces are preparing this separation also from an economic point of view. An argument in this respect would be the fact that the [privatization] certificates and coupons in Transylvania are directed, through some consultant firms of the UDMR, towards Harghita and Covasna. The PUNR representatives also claim that Magureanu told them that UDMR allegedly sponsors 70,000 firms whose main activity is commerce with products that derive from the small border zone trade.

Romania: Counterespionage Chief on Hungarian Activity

AU1903174496 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 15 Mar 96 p 1

[Article by Radu Tudor: "General Victor Negulescu, Chief of the MApN Counterespionage Directorate, Confirms Certain Aspects Reported by the SRI Director to Parliament"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In connection with certain assertions made by Adrian Nastase, executive president of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania], regarding the existence of certain intelligence and paramilitary bodies of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania, as well as the reports on similar activities as presented by Virgil Magureanu, director of the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service], we asked Division General Victor Negulescu, chief of the National Defense Ministry [MApN] Counterespionage Directorate, to say to which extent the signaled aspects correspond to reality. He pointed out that some of the remarks made lately are genuine, but to confirm all of them would premature before proper investigations are undertaken.

According to other sources our reporters have had access to, currently it is to be noted that the Hungarian espionage bodies, even supported by intelligence officers of other interested countries, have strongly activated their residents, have reorganized their intelligence and operative cells, and are very much interested in various economic and military aspects related to the autonomy of the ethnic Hungarian minority.

Romania: PNTCD: Duma USSR Decision 'Warning Signal'

AU1903131396 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 18 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The leadership of the Christian-Democratic Peasant Party [PNTCD] considers that the decision of the Russian State Duma to cancel the disbanding of the USSR represents a warning signal and a danger to the neighboring regions. At today's weekly conference of the PNTCD, Senator Radu Vasile, secretary general of the party, emphasized that in that context it was necessary for the political settings to be changed in Romania, because only in such a way would we be able to gain rapid access to NATO.

Talking about the draft bill altering the Penal Code, Radu Vasile stressed that the PNTCD legislators will only vote in favor of the draft if its initiators renounce Article 236. The article refers to offenses against the authorities and, in the opinion of the PNTCD senator, it represents an attack against the freedom of the press, reports our correspondent Maria Cristea.

Romania: Government Said To Train PLO 'Fighters'

AU1903170896 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 13 Mar 96 p 12

[Article by Gabriel G. Stanescu: "The Romanian Government Spent One and a Half Billion From the Budget To Secretly Train Palestinian Fighters"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Kamel Ahmed Mohammed Habed el-Kader Gave $1 Million To Finance Iliescu's Electoral Campaign

Despite vehement statements of denial made by Traian Chebeleu [presidential spokesman], Adrian Nastase [Chamber of Deputies speaker and executive president

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of the ruling Social Democracy Party of Romania—PDSR], and Viorel Hrebenciuc [government secretary general], the weekly CATAVENCU has revealed that the temporary rulers of Romania organized the training of a group of Palestinian fighters. In the period between June 1994 and November 1995 the SPP [Guard and Protection Service] spent 599.675 million lei for their "schooling" at the Center for the Training of Cadres in Branesti (formerly belonging to the SIE [Foreign Intelligence Service]). For the drills at Saftica the SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] allotted 336 million lei, while the Interior Ministry, through the A.I. Cuza Police Academy, spent another 552.331 million lei, money that also came from the taxpayers. Altogether the money that was thrown out the window amounts to 1,412,706,000 lei, paid from the taxes of the Romanian citizens, and all this while they kept refusing the wage increase claims of the trade unions, the retired, or young people.

A person who is also involved in this scandal is a cousin of Zaher Iskandarani [Syrian-born businessman in Timisoara, claimed to have close connections with President Ion Iliescu, currently under police arrest while investigations are carried out related to various corruption affairs], namely Kamel Ahmed Mohammed Habed el-Kader, no less than Viorel Hrebenciuc's counselor for Palestinian issues. As the saying goes, one hand washes the other, as back in 1992 Kader gave $1 million to finance Ion Iliescu electoral campaign. The money came from cigarette smuggling deals, which were carried out under the protection of Romanian officials. After being accused by Adrian Severin [Democratic Party leader] of contacts with Kader, PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase, presidential spokesman Traian Chebeleu, as well as Government Secretary General Viorel Hrebenciuc all denied having any kind of relations with Kader. The latest information, however, as well as the photographs published by CATAVENCU, confirm both the ties of the three aforementioned officials, as well as those maintained by Ion Iliescu and Nicolae Vacaroiu [prime minister] with the cousin of Zaher Iskandarani.

Romania: Parliament Passes Draft Bill on Political Parties

AU1903204196 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 2000 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] During today's joint parliament session, the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate passed in the version elaborated by the Chamber of Deputies the draft bill on the organization and functioning of political parties.

According to the aforementioned version, ethnic minorities have the right to belong to a political party without any restrictions on ethnicity.

The deputies and senators then began to debate the texts on which the two chambers disagree regarding the government ordinance regulating the organization and financing of research. They discussed and passed by articles the report of the budget and finance commissions of the two chambers regarding the government ordinance rectifying the 1995 [as heard] state budget.

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Slovenia: Timetable Set for Refugees' Return

96BA0209B Ljubljana SLOVENEC in Slovene
23 Feb 96 p 9

[Article by Vesna Voglar: "The First Group Is To Lose Refugee Status on 30 June 1996"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana—Less and less is being written and said here about the refugees. According to the Dayton agreement, there is supposed to be peace in Bosnia and the state is to be slowly set up. Of course, the issue of the refugees' return is also connected with rebuilding Bosnia.

High Commissioner's Office Strategy for Refugees' Return

Milos Sustar, the director of the Office for Resettlement and Refugees, described to us Slovenia's concept for the refugees' return and the positions of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]. He said that the UNHCR presented its vision of Bosnian reconstruction on 16 January in Geneva. It also singled out the issue of the refugees' return as one of the difficulties. The basic principle is that return will be voluntary. They are aware that they will not be able to comply with all the wishes of the refugees, and consequently after a certain time there will also be returns that are not entirely voluntary. They expect that this year approximately 180,000 people, including 8,000 from Slovenia, will return to their homes. That figure is very high and difficult to achieve, in Milos Sustar's opinion. He said that the UNHCR had prepared a prioritized list: First of all, it is necessary to resettle people in Bosnia, then it will be the turn of other states in the former Yugoslavia, and then will come other countries. "It is hard to foresee how the resettlement will proceed, since in previous cases (experiences primarily from developing countries and not from Europe) people's movements took place spontaneously. For the time being, the return of people to Bosnia will also be spontaneous (30,000 of them are already supposed to have returned), but later on it will be different," Milos Sustar emphasized. A convoy of about 500 people will leave Slovenia soon to return to Sanski Most and Kljuc. The office will be involved in this self-organized action by paying the transportation expenses.

Draft on Cancellation of Temporary Status

Slovenia already has a draft on cancellation of the refugees' temporary status and on their return. It is now being reviewed by other ministries. According to that draft, the cancellation of that status would consist of at least two parts. The Office for Refugees has proposed that the status be cancelled first for refugees who come from the territory of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation (the exceptions are the sick, the aged, mothers with children...). The tentative date is 30 June. By the end of the year that status will be taken away from everyone.

The issue of the actual voluntary nature of the return arises. Milos Sustar said that before their status is cancelled the refugees will have to decide whether to return, find another solution in Slovenia, or leave for a third country. Only those who meet the conditions in the Law on Foreigners will be able to remain in Slovenia. Temporary refuge must not become a reason for permanent residence here or for economic migration. According to a survey conducted in December among the refugees, there are approximately 3,000 refugees who have close relatives in Slovenia. It is to be expected that this group will remain in Slovenia but not as temporary refugees. Also problematic are mixed marriages. Those people are possible applicants for refugee status.

The office is considering making a temporary return possible for adult refugees. This would mean that they could go to Bosnia, look over the situation, repair their houses... and return before the deadline for cancellation of their status. The issue of reconstruction is also associated with the refugees' return. Slovenia cannot compete with the developed countries: "In the last four years, approximately 150,000 people have found a temporary home in our country. In terms of the number of inhabitants, we were among the countries with the heaviest burden. We spent $100 million of our own money to take care of them. We will have limited capabilities for participating in reconstruction. It is not to be expected that we will contribute to the rebuilding of the homes of the 18,000 refugees who are in Slovenia now. Bosnia-Herzegovina does not expect that of us, either. Slovenia can help in rebuilding apartments and by providing technical and intellectual services (education, etc.). The strategy for reconstruction assistance has not yet been decided, however."

Difficulties With Transit of Refugees Through Slovenia

Slovenia will also have difficulties with the transit of refugees through the country. For the countries of Western Europe, the refugee issue will not be resolved when those people cross the Karawanken. The Ministry of Internal Affairs is already preparing for this. Transit will be permitted only for individuals who have their documents in order. Without them, they will be sent back to the country from which they came. According to the available data, there are supposed to be approximately 2 million Bosnian refugees in Europe,

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and the majority of them will probably cross the Slovene border.

Red Cross Also in the Project

The Slovene Red Cross has also joined in preparing the strategy for the refugees' return from Slovenia. They participated in preparing an analysis of the refugees' desires and interests regarding their area of residence and regarding their return, and in preparing a draft plan for the return, which they will propose to the government. Together with the Ministry of Health, they are preparing a proposed program and fund for assistance to those wounded and injured in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through the fund, many wounded people are to be provided treatment and rehabilitation in Slovenia, and expert assistance and support would also be provided to health care personnel and hospitals in Bosnia.

[Box, p 9]

According to Slovene Red Cross data, 18,666 refugees reside in our country, of whom 6,043 are living at reception centers and 12,264 are living with host families. Since 1994 international assistance has declined a great deal, and now the Red Cross has nothing in its warehouse. The Red Cross has also regularly sent convoys with aid to Bosnia (medicines, sanitary materials...).

The cost of food for one refugee at the reception centers, according to the office's data, is approximately 309 tolars per day. That amount will soon be somewhat higher, since it has not been updated since last April. The total costs of caring for a refugee are from 15,000 to 16,000 tolars per month. The highest costs are for health care, since they have amounted to approximately 4,000 tolars per person for the last quarter. Because of the shortage of money and the refugees' imminent return, the standards will become stricter.

Slovenia: SKD Leader Predicts Electoral Victory in Fall

AU1803140496 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Mar 96 p 2

[Article by Grega Repovz: "Peterle Announces Elections in the Second Half of October"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ljubljana, 10 March—"When members of the Slovene Christian Democratic Party [SKD] start working, the dynamics of development increase," said SKD leader Lojze Peterle on the occasion the party's seventh anniversary celebration in Bled on Saturday [9 March]. He told the attending party members and followers that he gave his party's ministers in Brussels the highest ratings. He added that Minister Ster and the Interior Ministry are becoming a model for success and good work even among European countries.

Peterle said that the Christian Democrats are the only European party in Slovenia and that, after the fall of the first democratic government in Slovenia (led, of course, by the Christian Democrats), the dynamics of development in Slovenia had decreased and that the forces from the former period were still hindering the country's development. He announced that his party would be victorious at the autumn elections, which will, according to his prediction, take place in the second half of October. He has not discussed moving the elections from November to October with the representatives of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS], but he is certain that they will agree with his suggestion. The final decision on the date will be made by President Milan Kucan.

Peterle is delighted that the United List of Social Democrats [ZLSD] has left the ruling coalition since the other coalition partner, the LDS, thus showed the direction in which it is planning to go. Peterle said that the coalition did not result from amiability but from need. They did not have a parliamentary majority, but they had to form a government, even if it meant forming it with a liberal party. The fact that the Liberals are so strong in Slovenia is not very European, but this situation will be amended at the next elections. "What happened in 1992 will not happen at the autumn election. At the last elections, SKD voters were influenced by and voted for other parties that led Slovenia back onto the old paths," said Peterle.

Apart from Peterle, other speakers also took the podium. Janko Dezelak, minister for economic relations and development, stressed that there was no time to lose in reaching economic goals. Nevertheless, Slovenia is on the right path to fulfilling the Maastricht criteria in advance. In his opinion, this is also a long-term prediction that Slovenia will be taking part in [European] integration. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: Ljubljana Radio Journalists Continue Strike

AU1903174396 Ljubljana Radio Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Summary] The newscast begins with the following announcement read by a studio announcer:

"Esteemed listeners, the Strike Committee of the Trade Union of the Radio-Television Slovenia Journalists has authorized me to read to you the following announcement No. 4 of the Strike Committee: T[illegible] Radio-Television Slovenia journalists' strike in Ljubljana,

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Maribor, and Koper continues. We point out that we are not on strike for higher wages but for the implementation of the collective agreement for Slovene professional journalists. We journalists only demand to be assigned working places as envisaged by the collective agreement for professional journalists. With the agreement we reached on 5 February, the management of Radio-Television Slovenia obligated itself to immediately implement the new categorization and recognize basic income according to the collective agreement, but it was not done when wages were paid out on 15 March. This is why the journalists began the strike yesterday. Following yesterday's negotiations, the Strike Committee leadership issued the proposal which was discussed by the Strike Committee and conveyed to the management, and proposed continuating negotiations today at 1700 [1600 GMT]. We inform you that during the strike, there will be no journalistic reports and that only journalists authorized by the Strike Committee may appear before microphones or cameras. All others who appear without that authorization will bear the consequences. We apologize to listeners and viewers and ask them for understanding.

[Signed] The Strike Committee of the Trade Union of Radio-Television Slovenia Journalists and the Trade Union of Slovene Journalists."

The announcer then reads the following announcement by the management of Radio-Television Slovenia: "Yesterday in the evening of 18 March 1996, we negotiated with representatives of the Strike Committee of the Trade Union of Journalists employed in Radio-Television Slovenia. We agreed that next morning by 1000, we would once again present them with our proposals for end of the strike about which we negotiated on 18 March. We did so at 1015. At 1520, we received the Strike Committee's reply in which it proposes the continuation of negotiations at 1700. We will report on the outcome of these talks in the following newscasts. We tell our listeners and viewers that we will be preparing the most important reports until the strike ends, on which Radio-Television Slovenia is making an effort. We are asking you to accept our apology for the affected newscasts."

The program continues with music without any accompanying announcements.

Slovenia: Daily on Possible Krsko Nuclear Plant Closure

AU1903145796 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 11 Mar 96 p 3

[Commentary by Franci Dovc: "The Transparent Closing of the Krsko Nuclear Plant"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first moves to purchase new and replace the old evaporators [uparjalnik] in the Krsko Nuclear Power Plant [Jedrska Elektrarna Krsko—JEK] started in mid-January. At the beginning of last week, Dr. Leo Seserko [MP of the Green Party of Slovenia] sent his proposal to the voters for presentating a demand to the president of the State Chamber for a referendum regarding the closure of the JEK. The Slovene Ecological Movement founded the national board for the preparation of the referendum about a month ago. The representatives of Greenpeace also presented their demands for the plant's closure this year. The Autonomous Group for Lasting Energetics has organized a number of expert meetings within the framework of nongovernmental organizations and various expert organizations, and is preparing a public discussion on the subject in the future. The demands of neighboring Austria are also known, and the newest demands for closure made by the Italian delegation in the European Parliament are, in a sense, additional conditions for Slovenia's associate membership in the European Union.

All kinds of pressure and demands for an early closure of the JEK are therefore surfacing, and it seems that these will probably increase, considering the election preparations. The same applies to various groups in neighboring Austria and Italy, who have made their interests more or less clear. By accepting the strategy for the rational use and supply of energy in Slovenia, Krsko received an approval from the State Chamber to begin with further procedures.

Bearing this in mind, we have to ask ourselves whether the continuous operation of the JEK just might be too sensitive and politicalized an issue for the government and delegates to deal with too easily. This does not pertain to doubts about the expertise and carefulness of those responsible for the safe operation of the JEK, but only to the question of whether a group of delegates really has the right to make judgments on sensitive issues, such as the future of Krsko. If the delegates did not show enthusiasm for a referendum, they could at least base their decisions on a carefully planned survey of public opinion, covering a large sample of the population. This would be a good way to answer a number of suspicions that have been brought out in public, and a way to guarantee a greater legitimacy

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in the decisionmaking process. However, the situation remains unclear, and this fact will be used, to their benefit, by the opponents of nuclear energy.

There is no doubt that buildings set aside for nuclear purposes are among the greatest potential dangers for humanity. However, the question arises as to how many of the various groups that are advocating the closure of the JEK are really primarily concerned with humanity and a clean environment, and how many of them would see this only as an attainment of their political or other goals. If all those opposed to nuclear power in our country would have the same intentions and goals, they could join into a united movement even in this small Slovenia, and so be a more serious opponent for the pronuclear lobby. The government and parliament are both well aware of this, whereas all these events leave the average Slovene mainly confused.

It is therefore questionable how the supporters of a referendum will manage, during the election campaigns, to convince voters for an early closure. Even the demands directed from our northern and western neighbors are rather transparent, since the closure of the JEK will not decrease the danger for their inhabitants. Just the countries bordering Austria (not counting Slovenia) currently have 17 operational nuclear power plants, and six more are either being built or are in the planning stage. There are 133 working nuclear power plants within the same distance as Chernobyl, and if we include Russia, the number increases by 85 more, potentially really dangerous nuclear sites. There are 432 nuclear power plants in the world, and 48 are still under construction. In short, taking all this into consideration, the role of Krsko decreases.

However, the noble suggestions of our neighbors are, at the moment, at the stage of an implied intention of assistance with the substitution of energy (if Krsko were closed) in an integrated power supply system. Some of the important people in our country have already been informed about these suggestions. However, this opens up another chapter which will bring about very uncomfortable feelings with those who do care about what will be happening to our little country in the future.

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Federal

FRY: Lilic Receives Russian Ambassador to Belgrade

LD1903173596 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1350 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 19 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav President Zoran Lilic on Tuesday [19 March] received Russian Ambassador to Yugoslavia Yurly Kotov at his request.

Kotov conveyed President Boris Yeltsin's message to Lilic, the presidential information department has stated.

FRY: France To Send More Humanitarian Aid for Refugees

LD1903170096 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1249 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 19 (TANJUG)—France will send another convoy of humanitarian aid to the government of the FR [Federal Republic] of Yugoslavia, the French Embassy in Belgrade said Tuesday [19 March].

The convoy will comprise 5,000 pairs of shoes and 20 tonnes of food products intended for Serb refugees from Krajina, who have found refugee in the FRY.

Of the total of 250,000 Serb refugees from Krajina who fled Croatia's aggression last August, most of them have found refuge in the FRY.

The convoy will also include medicine and medical equipment intended for centers in the Republika Srpska [Serb Republic].

The sending of humanitartian aid will continue in 1996, the French Embassy said in a statement to TANJUG.

FRY: Supreme Defense Council Reviews Military Doctrine

LD1903181396 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1641 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 March (TANJUG)—A session of the Supreme Defense Council [SDC], chaired by Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], was held in Belgrade today, the FRY president's military office has reported.

The SDC discussed the FRY military doctrine, model for the organization of the Yugoslav Army and the army's funding.

The SDC also discussed implementation of the military part of the Dayton Agreement and stressed the FRY's consistency in meeting the assumed commitments stemming from the peace process in the former Yugoslavia.

The FRY will, it was said, continue making efforts in strengthening peace and security in the Balkans region, thus simultaneously strengthening the security, independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY.

The SDC discussed other issues within its constitutional competence at today's session.

In addition to the SDC members, Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Republic of Serbia, and Momir Bulatovic, president of the Republic of Montenegro, the session was also attended by Radoje Kontic, federal prime minister, Col. Gen. Momcilo Perisic, chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav Army, and Bogoljub Bjelica, deputy federal defense minister, the statement of the FRY president's military office says.

FRY: Article Examines Standard of Living, Consumer Prices

AU1903173896 Belgrade VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 12 Mar 96 p 13

[Article by Biljana Sacic: "Is Chaos Knocking at the Door?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The difference between the official and black market exchange rates for the dinar is 10 percent in Yugoslavia at the moment. This difference has been stable at that level, which almost corresponds to the inflation rate in January, which amounted to 9.5 percent. Economists predict that the monthly inflation rate could reach a level of between 11 and 14 percent in February, which would amount to 350 to 480 percent per year! As the Yugoslav population can still remember the unforgettable year 1993, it knows very well what such figures can mean: Is Hyperinflation knocking at the door again?

Since the time Dragoslav Avramovic's Program 2 for economic recovery started, there has been no relief for the Yugoslav population, measured by its effects on prices and purchasing power.

Huge Taxes

Mr. Tomislav Milisavljevic, head of the Macroeconomic Research and Market Conditions Division at the "Izit" Market Research Institute, said to VESTI—after having analyzed the price growth, salaries, and inflation rate to be expected—that prices and the inflation rate began to rise considerably in the autumn of 1994 and at the beginning of 1995, which has also made retail prices rise, which in turn affected living costs and, consequently, the real purchasing power of the population.

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Prices rose until November 1995, and then there came a relative improvement, as retail prices rose by only 5.5 percent. In December 1995, however, prices jumped by as much as 7.4 percent compared to November. In January 1996 there was a 9.5 percent rise in prices. The rise in retail prices was certainly caused by manufacturers, who gradually increased the manufacturing prices in the industry. The biggest increase in prices was recorded in raw material and production material prices, which amounted to approximately 27.3 percent; they are the precondition for the rise in prices in the processing sector, too.

Mr. Milisavljevic explains that the basic manufacturing costs also include the depreciation of the equipment that is not working to capacity; apart from that, the production rate is falling and the number of employees has not been reduced to the necessary level. The employees are given paid vacations, which burdens the already high manufacturing costs per manufacturing unit. According to Mr. Milisavljevic, big costs also arise from fiscal or similar obligations. Especially high are social insurance contributions on salaries and wages. The basis for the payment of customs duties was raised by 3.3 percent at the beginning of 1996, because of a change in the dinar value. This should have been neutralized by a decrease in customs duty rates and other taxes, but there has been no reduction so far. According to Mr. Milisavljevic, these are the most important costs responsible for the rise in prices and the inflation rate.

According to statistics, the customer's bag is the most important indicator of price increases. The bag cost 596.33 dinars in January 1995, whereas the January 1996 bag cost 1.116.30 dinars! This means that it became twice as expensive, by 45 percent, in spite of the materialization of Program 1.

Two and a Half Salaries for the Bag

The inflation rate amounted to 120 percent last year, from December 1994 to December 1995, as measured by the increase in retail prices. Milica Todorovic, an expert at the Republic Institute for Statistics, said that salaries and wages rose, but not to a degree that could have followed the rise in prices, so that the purchasing power dropped. As a good example, she also mentions the customer's bag, which cost 2.5 salaries or wages in January 1996, whereas it cost approximately 2 salaries or wages in January 1995.

"What will the Yugoslav population be confronted with, if hard currencies continue to be traded on the black market, remains to be seen, but it is quite clear that inflation is knocking at the door. The economists are, naturally, less panicky, but neither are they calm when thinking about inflation prospects, as businessmen dictate the situation on the market, and claim that costs are high, which means that prices will have to be raised, which will raise the inflation rate, which means that the people will have a difficult life."

"Bleak" Expectations

According to the assessment of Tomislav Milisavljevic, the head of Macroeconomic Research and Market Conditions Research Division at the "Izit" Market Research Institute, the rise in prices will temporarily be slowed down, but the analyses carried out by the Institute every month show that businessmen expect manufacturing prices to keep on rising. On the basis of an opinion poll, 44 percent of the businessmen in industry expect the manufacturing prices to rise in the next three months. Only after that period could the increase in prices—according to poll takers—slow down, as it is expected that the present disparities will be corrected.

"In other words, it can be expected that inflation will rise in the next three months, which means that purchasing power will fall, although salaries should follow production growth, the achieved marketing results, and the completed payment transactions, which is difficult to achieve under conditions of insolvency." According to Mr. Milisavljevic, it cannot be expected that salaries will follow the rising inflation rate—they might even not be able to follow the production growth.

This means that only after the period of harmonizing of disparities has passed, after everyone has taken his part from the customer's pocket, can slower price increases and an increase in salaries be dreamed about. People would say: "The sun will come after the rain!" The question is, however, how long it will rain.

The Customer's Bag Is Getting "Heavier" and "Heavier"

Nikola Dragas, the author of the customer's bag, which is calculated by the Federal Institute for Statistics, says that the value of the bag rises every month. It is obvious that salaries cannot follow real increases in prices, so that the customer's pocket is getting smaller and smaller.

If we take the bag value from November when the Program 2 started, the value of the customer's bag was as follows: It cost 960.96 dinars in November, 1,052.38 dinars in December, 1,116.30 dinars in January, and 1,171.71 dinars in February. The 1995 January bag cost 596.33 dinars, which is 45 percent less than in January 1996.

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[Box, p 13]

"Purchasing Power is Falling"

"The January 1996 salary was 459 dinars, it was nominally higher by 5 percent, but the purchasing power fell by 13 percent compared to December. Compared to the salary in January 1995, its real purchasing power was reduced by 15 percent. Salaries have a slower nominal increase than the increase in prices, so that their real purchasing value falls," Mr. Tomislav Milisavljevic said.

[Box, p 13]

Biggest Increase in Price of Spinach

If we take out the prices of some foods from the customer's bag in February, we can see that the spinach price rose by 174.8 percent compared to January, oranges were more expensive by 15.7 percent, cheese and chocolate by 13.01 percent, chicken by 7.06 percent, rice by 9.02 percent, flour by 10.6 percent, pasta by 20.05 percent, biscuits by 11.04 percent, meat from 2 to 5 percent, and meat products by 10 percent on the average, milk by 1.08 percent and beer by 8 percent.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic Views Purpose, Results of Geneva Talks

AU1803210296 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 18 Mar 96

[Interview with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic by Zoran Jevdjovic in Geneva on 18 March—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Jevdjovic] Mr. President, the Geneva meeting, which has been devoted to the implementation of the Dayton accord, is over. Can you tell us how you see the results of the conference?

[Milosevic] The task of this meeting was to make all the signatories of the Dayton agreement contribute to the speeding up and strengthening of the implementation of the agreement in all of its aspects, through the exchange of views and agreements that they reach among themselves on the measures that need to be taken.

In this sense, the three parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina have reached an agreement to finally free all prisoners, which is one of the very important steps toward the relaxation of tensions. Second, I think that it is exceptionally important that the most important political issue for the final creation of conditions for the normalization of relations in both the Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat federation, the issue of elections, is to be treated, I would say, in an almost identical way by all the parties. All the parties agree that it is necessary to speed up the process of preparations for and the holding of elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a suitable ambiance for the functioning of normal institutions and the creation of normal living conditions for citizens can duly be created in that way.

And finally, something quite specific—I think that this is also a good piece of news for the citizens of both Banja Luka and Sarajevo—we have agreed to open air traffic between Belgrade and Banja Luka and between Belgrade and Sarajevo. This will also represent yet another contribution to facilitating contacts among the people and creating conditions for the normalization of relations in this area as a whole.

All in all, I would say that today's meeting and the contacts that we have had with all the sides and the representatives of the United States and the Contact Group member countries can be assessed very positively.

Serbia: Milosevic Meets With Christopher, Tudjman

AU1803211296 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 18 Mar 96

[Report by Zoran Jevdjovic in Geneva]

[FBIS Translated Text] Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today held separate talks in the U.S. mission in Geneva with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher. They concluded that the implementation of the military agreement has been almost completely successful, and that eveything that had been agreed on has been done.

In that sense, Milosevic and Christopher concluded during their talks that the most significant lagging is in the political sphere. They have therefore agreed to do everything possible for the elections to be held in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the deadlines envisaged by the Dayton agreement.

Both the Yugoslav and U.S. sides praised highly the role of Yugoslavia in the overall stabilization in the crisis area. They concluded that so far Yugoslavia has been the side that has fully met its obligations as stipulated by the Dayton agreement. Because of that, they stressed that all the international players should do much more than that they have done so far. They should make special efforts to organize fair and honest elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible, elections that would give legality and legitimacy to the new representatives in the Bosnian union.

The joint belief arrived at during the Milosevic-Christopher meeting is that joint efforts on the

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implementation of the Dayton peace agreement will continue, and that the full support of the international community and, of course, IFOR [Implementation Force] in Bosnia will continue to be sought. As stated, the two countries will cooperate in this respect fully.

During their talks in the U.S. mission in Geneva, President Milosevic and Secretary of State Christopher today spoke especially about bilateral issues and the prospects for improving cooperation between the two countries. In that respect, they stressed that the two countries will cooperate especially in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and that they will cooperate fully on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Washington.

As you have probably already been informed, President Milosevic has had a series of bilateral meetings with politicians and diplomats who are present here in Geneva.

At the end of the working day, Presidint Milosevic also met Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. Presidents Milosevic and Tudjman have assessed positively the agreements reached in Zagreb last week by the foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia, Milan Milutinovic and Mate Granic respectively. The two presidents have stressed that these agreements represent an important step toward the full normalization of relations between the two countries.

Serbia: SRS Leader Criticizes Agreement Reached in Geneva

LD1903160996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1436 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, 19 Mar (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], said today that "Muslims and Croats would not comply with what was agreed in Geneva yesterday."

In a statement for SRNA he said that "the Muslim and Croat sides would not comply with the agreement on the release of all prisoners" and added that "almost the same could be said about the restoration of air traffic."

According to him, "there is nothing serious in the agreement on the restoration of the Belgrade-Sarajevo air route, but when it comes to the Belgrade-Banja Luka route it would be good if it were restored as soon as possible." [passage omitted]

Serbia: DS Leader Djindjic Criticizes Geneva Meeting

LD1903202996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Mar (SRNA)—Zoran Djindjic, the president of the Democratic Party [Demokratska Stranka—DS], today described the Geneva meeting as "a completely unnatural gathering preoccupied with marginal issues."

He told SRNA that "such a high-level meeting was devoted to trivial topics," and added that "there was no need for the presidents of Croatia and Serbia to travel to Geneva, and the same applies to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher."

According to Djindjic, "the negotiators reached agreement on something which had already been agreed several times—the release of prisoners, but the real problem was not discussed—the ethnic cleansing of Sarajevo."

"The problem of prisoners is quite serious but the truth is that the exodus of tens of thousands of Sarajevo Serbs gives more reason for concern," Djindjic said in conclusion.

Serbia: Milosevic Meets With UN Administrator Klein

LD1903160796 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1425 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Mar (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic today received the UN administrator in the Srem-Baranja area, U.S. diplomat Jacques Klein, and his aides.

Jacques Klein informed President Milosevic about the activities he had undertook with his team since becoming the UN administrator in the area, aimed at securing the successful implementation of the Erdut agreement.

Attention was drawn to the importance of cooperation between the local [Srem-Baranja] authorities and the UN administrator and his team as a necessary condition for the normal flow of life and the efficient protection of the freedom, rights, and security of the people living in the area. International financial institutions will follow suite with concrete support designed to stimulate economic activities and social security.

According to a statement issued by the office of President Milosevic, the talks were also attended by Assistant [Yugoslav] Federal Foreign Minister Zivadin Jovanovic.

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Serbia: Milosevic Receives Marjanovic, Government Members

LD1903151596 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1416 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 19 Mar (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic received today Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic and members of the government. The reception was held on occasion of the second anniversary of the government being in office.

Expressing his satisfaction with the successful government work in the past two years, President Milosevic underlined the importance of the tasks being realized by the government. As the priorities in this area he listed the economic revival of the country, raising of living standards, living in conditions of security and multilateral links, and cooperation of our country with the countries of Europe and the world.

Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic and the members of government informed President Milosevic on the government program for 1996, especially on measures for the realization of the industrial growth and on other questions of relevance for the country's development.

Present at the meeting was Dragan Tomic, speaker of the People's Assembly of Serbia.

Serbia: Prime Minister Says Cabinet Changes Imminent

LD1903215896 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1639 GMT 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 19 (TANJUG)—Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic announced Tuesday [19 March] his cabinet would undergo 'some changes' and that they would be announced in more detail in about a fortnight.

Summing up the two-year work of his cabinet, Marjanovic told reporters during a break in today's parliament session that the Serbian Government had 'managed to keep going' even though it had worked at the worst possible time, that of international sanctions.

'We have managed to get out of the sanctions thanks to a peace-making policy and our President (Slobodan) Milosevic. Now, we must increase production, the social product, the living standard, but we are having difficulties with shortages of floating assets. I think, however, that we shall succeed,' he said.

Marjanovic said exports would start 'already in the coming months,' explaining that 'production is moving on. Average growth for two months amounts to 8.7 percent, and this is followed by exports as most of these production operations are export-oriented.'

He said the planned production growth of 19 percent was realistic and that the government 'will not allow inflation, no matter what happens—there will be printing of money.'

Asked what was 'obstructing' trade with the European Union, Marjanovic said there were problems in part because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had not yet established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level, with the exception of France. He said he was certain there would be changes in this respect 'in a month's time.'

The Serbian prime minister said it was good that firms in Serbia were in direct contact with foreign firms. He said there were already cases of investments of foreign capital in production and technology.

Marjanovic pointed out that a contract had been signed between Serbia's Post, Telegraph and Telephone (PTT) company and Alcatel of France on investments worth about two billion dollars, and that deals involving high-speed trains were soon to be signed.

Serbia: Marjanovic on Efforts To Stabilize Economy

AU2003102696 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 19 Mar 96

[Interview with Serbian Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic by Momcilo Boskovic; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Boskovic] You, Mr. Marjanovic, were given the mandate in the most difficult of circumstances, during the period of brutal economic and political sanctions. That is why even the greatest of optimists predicted that your government would not last long, six months at the most.

[Marjanovic] That was predicted by people inclined toward the right political option, that is, the fervent right wing. They are interested only in gaining power. The assessment of the six month duration of the government was just their wishful thinking, and not the result of a realistic economic and political thinking.

During that time we made the effort to undertake measures that would contribute to the economic stabilization of the country under the most difficult of circumstances owing to the sanctions against our country. The sanctions have now been suspended thanks to the peace-loving policies of the Socialist Party of Serbia and President Milosevic. Therefore, they have to conclude now,

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if they are at all realistic, that a hard but successful period is behind us, and they have absolutely no grounds any more to say what they said at the start.

[Boskovic] What are the basic goals of the Serbian Government in the coming period? Can the citizens of Serbia expect better days ahead, higher production, employment, export, and better income?

[Marjanovic] I think that we have to do everything to improve the living standard of the Serbian citizens. I am sure that this can go hand in hand with the growth in production, and particularly in export. That way we will manage to reduce public spending relatively, and to raise salaries and pensions, and the general personal and social standard, by increasing productivity. We are in a rather complicated process since we have still not solved all the basic financial problems in terms of securing working capital for the economy. By solving the problem of real sources for the financing of production, I think that we can soon achieve more significant improvements in the living standard of the citizens.

[Boskovic] Now that you have mentioned pensioners, can we give them a ray of hope? Announce that the payment of pensions will in future be more regular, and perhaps even a few percentages higher?

[Marjanovic] The public must know that, over the last two years, it has been a more regular payment of salaries that we have devoted most of our attention and efforts to. The government is still doing what it can to improve the conditions for the payment of pensions both in the speed and legal level. That is why we have forwarded to the assembly proposals for an increase in contributions to the pension fund so that it should now be 29.4 instead of the earlier 25 percent. A series of additional measures has been proposed for increasing the pension fund. So concrete efforts have been made to find the necessary sources for the pensions. These efforts are really considerable since we do not have the additional burden of the economy but—regardless of how hard this is—we are going for the reduction in the [word indistinct] taxation of the economy for the 4.4 percent that is to be directed at the pension fund.

Serbia: Suspected War Criminal Takes Over Radio Station

AU2003123396 Paris AFP in English 1209 GMT 20 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, March 20 (AFP)—Notorious Serbian militia chief "Arkan" has taken over a Belgrade music radio station and named it after his gang accused of hundreds of brutal killings in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, staff at the station said Wednesday [20 March].

Zeljko Raznatovic, known as "Arkan," has bought Radio Pingvin from the Italian businessman Giovanni di Stefano, the deputy editor at the station [said].

Raznatovic, who is wanted for murder in several European countries in the late 1980s, was the chief of the Tiger Brigade militia which carried out hundreds of killings in Croatia in 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 targetting Croats and Moslems.

Protected by Belgrade authorities from arrest, he married Serbia's most popular female singer in Belgrade in early 1995.

Marko Jankovic, the deputy editor of Radio Pingvin, said the format of the music-based station would not change under the rule of its new boss and said there was no intention to introduce political coverage.

The new editor of the station is Borislav Pelevic, vice president of Raznatovic's extreme nationalist Serb Unity Party (SSJ).

Kosovo

Kosovo: Paper Views Lifting of Visas to Albania

AU1903155596 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 18 Mar 96

["Will the Border Crossing Regime Between Kosova and Albania Be Eased?"—KOSOVA DAILY REPORT headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] "The Inter-Albanian Border as the Remote End of the World" is the title of a long article of the Prishtina-based BUJKU newspaper featuring today (Monday) [18 March] the new situation in the wake of the ruling of the government of the self-proclaimed Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) on Thursday regarding the exit visa requirement for travel to Albania, which was revoked by.

Four days after the suspension of the anachronistic relics of the ruling adopted in 1981 by the government of the then Yugoslav Federation—which stipulated that exit visa requirements were to remain in place for those wishing to visit Albania (the targets being some 3 million Albanians of Kosova and other territories in the former Yugoslavia)—there is nothing new with regard to the visa regime: you cannot pass the border crossing at Vermice (between Prizren-Kosova, and Kukes-Albania) without an exit visa.

Many people who tried to travel to Albania via the Vermica border crossing told BUJKU reporters they

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were told by the Serb authorities at the border the ruling of the Belgrade Government has to appear in the OFFICIAL GAZETTE first. Some Serb authorities said they were expecting instructions on the way the ruling on revocation of the exit visas should be implemented.

There is a heavy Serbian military presence along the road from Prizren to the Albanian-Albanian border, as BUJKU reporters call the border dividing Kosova and Albania. The taxi driver who gave the reporters a lift to the border is optimistic: Prizren and Kukes will be within easy reach once the regime of passing the border is eased, he says. "You could go for a morning cup of coffee to Kukes, and get back in Prizren for the day," BUJKU quotes him as saying.

The seat of the League of Prizren [the Pan-Albanian proindependence movement, established in 1878], ordinary people and Albanians engaged in institutional life, are all living in expectation of a bit more relaxed border crossing regime, BUJKU says. "Only a few prickles of the barbed wire surrounding the prison which is Kosova are being removed," Besim Berisha, a young man, member of the Prizren branch of the Social Democratic Party of Kosova, is quoted as saying.

Another Albanian, Muhamet Krasniqi, graduate in economics, says whole families are looking forward to the possibility of familial ties of those having been lived in two separate countries being renewed once the exit visa requirement is effectively removed. "My wife has relatives in Shkoder," he said.

People in Prizren, the traditional Albanian town in south Kosova, listen to the Radio Kukes or Radio Tirana, for Albanian, the language of the majority of the population in the municipality has been banned by the Serbian-installed authorities and for six years not been broadcast from the local Prizren radio, the BUJKU newspaper notes.

The shops of the silversmith artisans in Prizren are virtually empty for fear of Serbian police looting, which is quite a common practice, the Albanian newspaper says.

Local residents in Prizren say only a solution to the Kosova issue based on the will of the people for independence can bring about a genuine opening of the Kosova-Albania border, the newspaper remarks, adding that the ancient Via Egnatia road, namely Prishtina-Prizren-Lezha, is the route which will revive the normal communications between Kosova and Albania.

The Kosova-Albanian border, a "Berlin(-like) wall" as is usually referred to by Albanians, has seen many Albanian fatalities in the past because of the impediments to a free movement of people in a border zone controlled by heavy Serbian police and military forces.

Meanwhile, in an interview with the Albanian TV on Sunday Prime Minister of the Republic of Kosova Dr. Bujar Bukoshi said Serbia had to undertake such a step, namely suspend the need for exit visas to Albania, for such a practice was "a monstruous thing inherited from the totalitarian communist regime."

Kosovo: Serb Police Detain Albanian Human Rights Activist

AU1903161696 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 18 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Adem Demaci, chairman of the Prishtina-based Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) was held for two hours at the Serbian police station in Hani i Elezit last Friday [15 March].

The CDHRF said Mr. Demaci was halted at the Kosova-Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] border zone, at Hani i Elezit, while on his way to Brussels where, invited by the European Parliament, he is to deliver a speech on 20 March.

The Serbian police inspectors cross-examined Adem Demaci for a couple of hours, seizing him copies of written materials, photographs and video cassettes testifying to the Serbian regime terror in Kosova.

Kosovo: Serbs Destroy Albanian Books, Documents

AU2003102796 Pristina KOSOVA DAILY REPORT in English 19 Mar 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The phantom Serbian "Panorama" publishing company—established in the spring of 1993 by the Serbian Parliament in the wake of the illegal take-over the "Rilindja" publishing company—has dumped down thousands of books, administrative documentation, manuscripts, and other material which happened to be in the offices of the Rilindja Publishing House (RPH) in the eighth storey of the Press Palace in Prishtina.

The staff of the RPH, the greatest publishing house in Albanian in Kosova since World War II, have tried to save what they could of their stock publications after their forceful eviction from their premises in 1993, Prishtina-based BUJKU newspaper said today, adding that part of their stock had remained in the press palace, now under the Serbian regime's control. The large stock of Albanian publications which the Serbs have dumped in the lobby of the Press Palace will probably be sent for recycling at the Paper Mill in Lipjan [Lipljan], a small

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town south of Prishtina, where thousands of copies of Albanian-language books of the Kosova National and University Library had been recycled.

"A good part of our titles as well as the documentation of our publishing house has been preserved, but we were unable to collect everything from our premises then," said Nazmi Rrahmani, the editor-in-chief of the Rilindja Publishing House, himself a prominent prose writer.

Mr. Rrahmani told BUJKU the Serbian management of the Panorama has threatened early this month they will, in addition, take over the RPH's store-house, 240 square meters, in which thousands of copies of titles published recently are located. The Panorama said it was going to do this because the RPH failed to pay for the rent in due time.

This is the pattern of the Serb regime behavior: illegally seize public property in Kosova, in this case of an Albanian firm, then charge the very same Albanians heavily aiming at further profit from the illegally appropriated property and assets.

BUJKU newspaper said today when some journalists of the BUJKU and RILINDJA daily protested against the outrageous act of the Serbs and attempted to collect part of the titles so as to spare them from utter devastation, the Panorama people called in the Serb police to intervene. In the very Serbian police presence, the Panorama Serbs continued dumping Albanian books, BUJKU says.

The stock of books and manuscripts of the Rilindja Publishing House, the Department of Albanian Periodicals, including the ZERI, have been dumped in the garbage corner of the Press Palace, now under phantom Panorama company, the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) said. They will probably be sent to Lipjan for recycling, the CDHRF added in a statement denouncing this outrageous move as a "crime against books."

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